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A Kantian Account of Aesthetically Sublime Rage

In Kant scholarship, little attention has been given to Kant’s claim in the Critique of the Power of Judgement that affects like rage and despair are “aesthetically sublime”. This neglect might suggest that Kant has nothing to say about these affects other than they are obstacles to proper reflection and that we have a duty to govern them (i.e., the duty of apathy). Moreover, it might look like Kant’s overall take on these affects is that they have a fully negative influence in how we conduct our lives. But this is not the case, or so I argue. In “A Kantian Account of Aesthetically Sublime Rage”, I focus on rage, and I argue that Kant’s account of rage as an “aesthetically sublime” affect allows us to infer that rage can have a distinctive social and political function in contexts of oppression. I argue that rage is “aesthetically sublime” because a) when one feels rage in response to a certain event (e.g., being subject to or witnessing racial injustice), a free play between imagination and a moral ideal (e.g., justice) takes place in one’s mind; and b) this rage does not play a motivational role for (immediate) action. Further, I assess the appropriateness of aesthetically sublime rage as a response to injustice. I argue that this kind of rage is appropriate in cases in which the agent genuinely and non-culpably does not know what to do as a reply to the injustice at stake.

► this event is hybrid. Join in person at the Centre for Ethics (Larkin building, room 200) or online here.

Martina Favaretto
Postdoctoral Fellow                                                    University of Toronto

Wed, Oct 18, 2023
12:00 PM - 02:00 PM
Centre for Ethics, University of Toronto
200 Larkin