Events @ C4E

  • Thu, Sep 13, 2018
    Public Lectures
    Atsushi Moriya: "Harmony Between Morality and Business: The Philosophy of Shibusawa Eiichi"

    Harmony Between Morality and Business: The Philosophy of Shibusawa Eiichi

    A lecture by:
    Atsushi Moriya
    Scholar in Residence
    Centre for Ethics, University of Toronto

    Shibusawa Eiichi (1840-1931) is regarded as the father of Japanese capitalism. He founded nearly 500 enterprises and economic organizations, most of which operate to this day. Equally dedicated to social and public welfare, he launched 600 philanthropic programs in many areas, including social welfare, education, and international exchange. His basic philosophy in the management of businesses was the harmony between morality and business.
    In recent years his thought has drawn increasing international attention for its ethical vision of capitalism as an alternative to the untrammeled profit-seeking and capital accumulation characteristic of contemporary market economies. His most famous work, The Analects and the Abacus, has been translated into Chinese nine times.
    This lecture will offer an overview of Shibusawa Eiichi’s thought, its roots in Confucian ethics, and its implications for 21st-century economic systems.

    Atsushi Moriya is a writer and a researcher. He is an expert in ancient
    Chinese thought and the thought of Shibusawa Eiichi, and has translated Shibusawa Eiichi’s books into modern Japanese. His translation of Shibusawa’s The Analects and the Abacus has sold over 130,000 copies.

    To register, please click here.

    Co-sponsored by



    06:30 PM - 08:00 PM
    Japan Foundation
    2 Bloor Street East, Suite 300

  • Mon, Sep 17, 2018
    Perspectives on Ethics
    Perspectives on Ethics: Klaus Günther

    Freedom in a Universe of Echoes?

    When we are going online, we cannot avoid that our data are collected. Private and (some) governmental organizations use these data to produce a personal profile of you and me, some for observation and surveillance, others for mirroring and continuously confirming my individual preferences, choices, my activities, thoughts, emotions by offering corresponding products. Something similar happens in social networks. Many users are looking for other people who confirm what they are thinking, saying and doing. Others participate in groups which are constituted by a shared world view or at least a shared view on some issues, whose members encourage each other to maintain their view. Of course it always happens that these people are confronted with information or with views which are different, which do not coincide with what they are thinking. But in a universe of echoes, dissent and dissonance, criticism and contestation are only one more opportunity to confirm or slightly modify one´s own view, but not to change it or to give it up. Conspiracy theories are the most prominent examples of such a method. In my presentation, I shall ask for the consequences to our freedom. When we make a choice in a universe of echoes – is this still a free choice? Or does freedom require the experience of dissent, contestation, and even of failure and learning? If the answer to the last question were yes, then freedom would be lost in a universe of echoes.

    Klaus Günther
    Goethe-Universitãt Frankfurt a.M.
    Faculty of Law & Excellence Cluster “Normative Orders”

    04:00 PM - 06:00 PM
    Centre for Ethics, University of Toronto
    200 Larkin

  • Tue, Sep 18, 2018
    Perspectives on Ethics
    Perspectives on Ethics: Lea Ypi

    Eleven Theses on Migration in the Capitalist State

    For much of the past century, the expansion of the political franchise and the related exercise of political rights meant that citizenship had the potential of being a vehicle of political emancipation. Democratic citizenship was essential to opposing capitalism with radical social reforms; it was one of the cornerstones of egalitarian policy for social democrats around the world. Contemporary trends in the admission of immigrants illustrate that citizenship has become once more increasingly selective, a good to be bought, sold or denied at the will of political elites, accessible once again along class lines. In light of these trends, I argue that citizenship has turned from a vehicle of political emancipation to one of social oppression.  I focus on contemporary practices of migrant integration and try to show how they are instrumental to consolidating the oligarchical character of the capitalist state and to entrenching its class divisions.

    Lea Ypi
    London School of Economics
    Professor in Political Theory
    Department of Government

    04:00 PM - 06:00 PM
    Centre for Ethics, University of Toronto
    200 Larkin

  • Wed, Sep 19, 2018
    Ethics at Noon
    Ethics@Noon: Rachel Cristy

    Justice in Nietzsche’s Virtue Epistemology

    This paper examines Nietzsche’s peculiar use of the word “justice” [Gerechtigkeit] and related terms, especially in the second of the Untimely Meditations, “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life,” but also continuing into his later works, notably On the Genealogy of Morality. Nietzsche’s usage is peculiar in two major respects. First, he speaks of justice primarily as an epistemic virtue or attitude rather than a moral or practical one: justice is a matter of attributing to everything (events, institutions, agents) the appropriate level of importance and value; Nietzsche claims that all actions, even (morally) just ones, require a stance of epistemic injustice. Second, “justice” in Nietzsche’s writing often has an affective cast: it is not merely a reliable disposition but a “will,” a “drive,” with a distinctive associated state of mind; it is not indifference or impassivity, the lack of interest or preference, but rather, as Nietzsche puts it in the Genealogy, “justice is always a positive affect.” I interpret these data by reading Nietzsche, following Alfano (2013), as a virtue epistemologist of the “inquiry responsibilist” type, who is interested not in offering definitions of knowledge of justification but in the mindset and attitudes appropriate to knowledge-seeking and the place of inquiry in a good human life. Finally, I offer some connections between Nietzsche’s unusual understanding of “justice” and some of his larger concerns, including his perspectivist epistemology and his critique of (post-)Christian morality.

    Rachel Cristy
    Centre for Ethics, University of Toronto
    Postdoctoral Fellow in Ethics

    12:30 PM - 02:00 PM
    Centre for Ethics, University of Toronto
    200 Larkin

  • Mon, Sep 24, 2018
    Perspectives on Ethics
    Perspectives on Ethics: Kali Gross

    The Butcher of Richard Street: Hannah Mary Tabbs, Black Womanhood, Violence, and Sovereignty

    Hannah Mary Tabbs, an African American southern migrant, was accused of throwing the severed torso of her paramour off of a bridge in Eddington, Pennsylvania, in 1887. Through the trial and investigation Tabbs emerged at once as a figure steeped in the horror and tragedy of American slavery and its violent aftermath and as a brutal neighborhood terror in her own right. Whereas most studies of black women in this era focus on their victimization, this research explores an instance of black female violence that did not appear to be explicitly motivated by self-defense or even financial gain but rather by the sheer thrill of the exercise of power and domination, and, ultimately, pleasure. Further, this presentation ponders whether a black woman’s decision to mobilize violence on her own behalf may uniquely sketch and challenge the interstices of race, gender, sexuality, and state power.

    Kali Gross
    Rutgers University
    Martin Luther King, Jr. Professor of History

    04:00 PM - 06:00 PM
    Centre for Ethics, University of Toronto
    200 Larkin

  • Tue, Oct 2, 2018
    Ethics of AI in Context
    Ethics of AI in Context: Moshe Vardi

    The Ethical Crisis in Computing?

    Computer scientists think often of “Ender’s Game” these days. In this award-winning 1985 science-fiction novel by Orson Scott Card, Ender is being trained at Battle School, an institution designed to make young children into military commanders against an unspecified enemy. Ender’s team engages in a series of computer-simulated battles,
    eventually destroying the enemy’s planet, only to learn then that
    the battles were very real and a real planet has been destroyed.

    Many of us got involved in computing because programming was fun.
    The benefits of computing seemed intuitive to us. We truly believe
    that computing yields tremendous societal benefits; for example, the
    life-saving potential of driverless cars is enormous! Like Ender,
    however, we realized recently that computing is not a game–it is
    real–and it brings with it not only societal benefits, but also
    significant societal costs, such as labor polarization, disinformation,
    and smart-phone addiction.

    The common reaction to this crisis is to label it as an “ethical crisis”
    and the proposed response is to add courses in ethics to the academic
    computing curriculum. I will argue that the ethical lens is too narrow.
    The real issue is how to deal with technology’s impact on society.
    Technology is driving the future, but who is doing the steering?

    Moshe Vardi
    Rice University
    Karen Ostrum George Distinguished Service Professor in Computational Engineering
    Director, Ken Kennedy Institute for Information Technology

    04:00 PM - 06:00 PM
    Centre for Ethics, University of Toronto
    200 Larkin

  • Wed, Oct 3, 2018
    Ethics at Noon
    Ethics@Noon: Kimmo Nuotio

    What’s Wrong and What’s Right with Deterrence Theories in Criminal Law

    Criminal law has many aims, one of them being that it seeks to influence human conduct. Criminal law has in-built theories about human action. Often some sort of rational action theory serves as a model. According to classical law and economics, human beings can be deterred by keeping the costs of offending high enough. The model of rational economic action has famously been challenged by findings of the so-called behavioral economics and law. Human beings simply fail to act rationally when studied empirically. Behavioral law and economics has created its own way, even its own language, to study law and regulation. We all know about ‘endowment’, ‘bounded rationality’, ‘nudging’, and ‘choice architecture’.

    The theory of positive general prevention, well known to Continental criminal law scholars, works on somewhat different premises than classical law and economics. According to that theory, human beings are able to internalize the moral and ethical values that the criminal law tells about which in turn gives individuals additional reasons not to offend. This theory could even be linked with the theory of a democratic Rechtsstaat, since the citizens quite obviously have reasons to respect legitimate norms. Even legal doctrines which provide for legal security and predictability could contribute to the legitimacy of criminal law.

    We should also mention regulatory theory, which has equally departed from classical law and economics. According to regulatory theory, at least if we read Christopher Hodges, no-blame cultures are most efficient as means to improve the quality of human action, be it in terms of security in civil aviation, or reducing malpractice by medical professionals. Often the solution seems to be to choose another regulatory option than criminal law. For serious violations of interests of others we may still need criminal law. From a regulatory point of view criminal law would still always also interact with ethics and social norms since criminalisations trigger effects on the side of the legal subjects, and on the side of the society at large. Hodges claims that behavioral law and economics is not enough to found socio-legal structures on the reality of how people make decisions. He tries to build an integrated theory, integrating theories of regulation, enforcement, compliance and ethics.

    I wish to look at more closely whether behavioral law and economics as well as the theory of regulation call for a reassessment of how we should think about criminal law as a way of regulating behavior. Is behavioral economics still too narrow, too utilitarian, to be relevant for criminal law theory? Isn’t it too reductionist in its style? How would regulatory theory see this? Should we only adopt the psychology part of it?

    It seems that the various approaches to and understandings about seeking to influence human behavior have very different criminal policy implications. As concerns environmental criminal law or economic criminal law, to take two examples, the Chicago-style law and economics leads to stressing the severity of (criminal) sanctions, whereas positive general prevention would leave more room for additional ethical reasons for actors in a company frame to work for minimizing the risk of crime. We do not need severe punishments to communicate blame. Much of EU criminal law seems to build on negative general deterrence.

    It looks as if it makes sense to stress that criminal law possesses certain specific qualities which go beyond simple instrumental and utilitarian concerns. The theory of positive general prevention might work even if we cannot expect people to act rationally. As criminal law uses blameworthiness to communicate values, this goes well together with the idea that the individuals should be approached as responsible citizens who have the ability to learn to do better. We need to go beyond a utilitarian theory of regulating behavior. This could even be a paradox: we have to introduce non-instrumental views about how criminal law is anchored in the society in order to truly understand how criminal law operates and becomes functional. There is different politics of criminal law involved, and a different view of the society.

    Nicola Lacey has put it aptly:

    ‘… as democratization proceeds, with the normative implication that the regulatory subject should be treated not only as a rational chooser but also in some stronger sense as an agent – as someone who not only makes choices but has some deeper form of responsibility for those choices, as a queen and not as a pawn – a non-instrumental attachment to the responsibility condition emerges.’ ‘Criminalization as Regulation’, in, Regulating Law (Eds. Parker et al), Oxford 2004, 158-159.

    Kimmo Nuotio
    University of Helsinki
    Faculty of Law

    12:30 PM - 02:00 PM
    Centre for Ethics, University of Toronto
    200 Larkin

  • Mon, Oct 15, 2018
    Perspectives on Ethics
    Perspectives on Ethics: Nils Holtug

    Does Nationhood Promote Egalitarian Justice? Challenging the National Identity Argument

    According to the national identity argument, a shared national identity is important for two aspects of social cohesion that, in particular, are required for egalitarian, distributive justice, namely trust and solidarity. I critically discuss the national identity argument as it pertains to social justice. I first provide a more detailed account of the argument. Then I consider, in greater detail, different conceptions of the nation on which the national identity argument may rely. Furthermore, I assess two theoretical arguments for why we should expect national identities to promote social cohesion and so distributive justice. According to the first, a shared identity tends to produce the emotional disposition towards compatriots required for trust and solidarity. According to the second, sharing an identity with someone tends to make their behaviour more predictable which makes it easier to trust them. However, neither of these two accounts of the causal mechanism leading from a national identity to trust and solidarity establishes the need for a national identity, or so I argue. For the purpose of assessing the empirical studies that test the national identity argument, I then decompose the argument in terms of the different elements that may be thought to causally impact social cohesion. On this basis, I survey the empirical evidence for and against the national identity argument. One worry pertaining to these studies is that, very often, they do not appropriately distinguish between different conceptions of the nation, or at least do not do so along the lines that political theorists have thought important. Therefore, I go into greater depth with a recent Danish study I have conducted with two colleagues – a study that aims more specifically to test the impact on trust and solidarity of conservative and liberal nationalist identities. I conclude that, just as the theoretical explanations to which nationalists appeal do not sufficiently support the national identity argument, nor does the empirical evidence that has been gathered so far.

    Nils Holtug
    University of Copenhagen
    Director, Centre for Advanced Migration Studies
    Professor of Political Philosophy
    Philosophy Section
    Department of Media, Cognition and Communication

    04:00 PM - 06:00 PM
    Centre for Ethics, University of Toronto
    200 Larkin

  • Tue, Oct 16, 2018
    Ethics of AI in Context
    Ethics of AI in Context: Mark Fox

    Mark S. Fox
    University of Toronto
    Distinguished Professor of Urban Systems Engineering

    04:00 PM - 06:00 PM
    Centre for Ethics, University of Toronto
    200 Larkin

  • Wed, Oct 17, 2018
    Ethics at Noon
    Ethics@Noon: Étienne Brown

    Misinformation and Freedom of Expression

    With the rise of ‘fake news,’ European liberal democracies are currently in the midst of a debate about the value of laws that aim to regulate the spread of false information on the internet. One central objection directed against such laws is that they represent undue violations of our individual right to freedom of expression. In this presentation, I argue that they do not. More precisely, I contend that legal prohibitions against the intentional spread of false information can be justified on three main philosophical accounts of free speech: the epistemic account, the civic duties account, and the harm-based account. I then consider the objection according to which any legal prohibition against intentional misinformation will unjustly set back the interests of individuals who unintentionally misinform others.

    Étienne Brown
    Centre for Ethics, University of Toronto
    Visiting Postdoctoral Fellow

    12:30 PM - 02:00 PM
    Centre for Ethics, University of Toronto
    200 Larkin

  • Thu, Oct 25, 2018
    Perspectives on Ethics
    Perspectives on Ethics: Derrick Darby

    Derrick Darby
    University of Michigan
    Department of Philosophy

    03:00 PM - 05:00 PM
    Centre for Ethics, University of Toronto
    200 Larkin

  • Fri, Oct 26, 2018
    Events on Campus, Ethics & the Arts, Ethics of AI in Context
    Reading Frankenstein: Then, Now, Next. A Celebration of the 200th Anniversary of Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein (1818-2018)

    Reading Frankenstein: Then, Now, Next. A Celebration of the 200th Anniversary of Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein (1818-2018) (October 26-31, 2018)

     

    12:00 AM - 11:59 PM


  • Tue, Oct 30, 2018
    Ethics of AI in Context
    Ethics of AI in Context: John Vervaeke

    Why the Creation of A.I. Requires the Cultivation of Wisdom on Our Part

    Abstract:  Most considerations concerning the ethics of A.I. are concerned with the ethical issues posed by the potential threat of the machines or concerning their ambiguous moral status and the resulting unclarity of our ethical obligations towards them.  However, a cognitive scientific approach suggests an additional ethical issue. There is converging theory and empirical evidence that while necessary, intelligence in not sufficient for rationality. Rationality requires acquiring skills for overcoming the  biases and the self-deception that inevitably result from any cognitive agent using optimization strategies.  These heuristic strategies often reinforce each other because of the complex and recursively self-organization nature of cognitive processing.  As our A.I. moves increasingly into Artificial General Intelligence (A.G.I), these patterns of self-deception increasing become possible in our machines. This vulnerability is pertinent to us because we are often unaware of our biases or how we are building them implicitly into our simulations of intelligence.  Since self-deception and foolishness are an inevitable result of intelligence, as we magnify intelligence will may also magnify the capacity for self-deception.  Our lack of rational self-correcting  self-awareness could very well be built into our machines. The examination of a couple of historical examples will add plausibility to this argument.  Given this argument, i will further argue that we have an ethical obligation to seriously cultivate a cognitive style of self-correcting self-awareness, i.e., wisdom, in individuals and communities of individuals who are attempting to create A.G.I.

    John Vervaeke
    University of Toronto
    Cognitive Science

    04:00 PM - 06:00 PM
    Centre for Ethics, University of Toronto
    200 Larkin

  • Tue, Nov 13, 2018
    Ethics of AI in Context
    Ethics of AI in Context: Avery Slater

    Kill-Switch: The Ethics of the Halting Problem

    Two centuries of dystopian thought consistently imagined how technologies “out of control” can threaten humanity: with obsolescence at best, with violent systemic destruction at worst. Yet current advances in neural networked machine learning herald the advent of a new ethical question for this established history of critique. If a genuinely conscious form of artificial intelligence arises, it will be wired from its inception as guided by certain incentives, one of which might eventually be its own self-preservation. How can the tradition of philosophical ethics approach this emerging form of intelligence? How might we anticipate the ethical crisis that emerges when machines we cannot turn off cross the existential threshold, becoming beings we should not turn off?

    Avery Slater
    University of Toronto
    Department of English

    04:00 PM - 06:00 PM
    Centre for Ethics, University of Toronto
    200 Larkin

  • Wed, Nov 14, 2018
    Ethics at Noon
    Ethics@Noon: Nicola Lacetera

    Ethical Concerns and the Reach of Markets: Paying Kidney Donors

    Legislation and public policies are often the result of competition and compromise between different views and interests. In several cases, strongly held moral beliefs voiced by societal groups lead lawmakers to prohibit certain transactions or to prevent them from occurring through markets. However, there is limited evidence about the specific nature of the general population’s opposition to using prices in such contentious transactions. We conducted a choice experiment on a representative sample of Americans to examine preferences for payments to kidney donors. We found strong polarization, with many participants in favor or against payments regardless of potential supply gains. However, about 20% of respondents would switch to supporting payments for sufficiently large supply gains. Preferences for compensation have strong moral foundations. Participants especially oppose systems with payments by organ recipients, which they find in conflict with principles of fairness and dignity. We corroborate the interpretation of the findings with the analysis of a costly decision to donate money to a foundation that supports donor compensation.

    Nicola Lacetera
    University of Toronto
    Department of Management UTM &
    Rotman School of Management

    12:30 PM - 02:00 PM
    Centre for Ethics, University of Toronto
    200 Larkin

  • Mon, Nov 19, 2018
    Perspectives on Ethics
    Perspectives on Ethics: Murad Idris

    Idealizations of Peace in Islamic Political Thought: The Case of Sayyid Qutb

    “Before us today is the problem of universal peace,” Sayyid Qutb declares in the prologue to his much-neglected Universal Peace and Islam (1951). “Does Islam have an opinion on the matter? Does Islam have a solution?” Albeit popularly considered the ideologue of “Islamic jihad,” the Muslim Brotherhood’s leading theorist designed a plan for universal peace. Qutb’s plan pegs the emergence of universal peace to an immanent organization of individual states with laws in common. Its promise of peace is embedded in an Enlightenment script that claims to correct unjust savagery through the state and the law. This is a script that calls up Immanuel Kant and Thomas Hobbes, specifically their predications of peace upon law and statehood. Drawing attention to Kant’s discussions of “the Arab” and Hobbes’s references to empire, this talk unpacks the unacknowledged salience of denials of law, political economy, and settler-colonialism for theorizations of peace. Qutb’s adaptations of that familiar logic unwittingly expose its limits, culminating with perpetual war against enemies whose laws and form are ‘wrong. This talk draws on a chapter of Idris’s book, War for Peace: Genealogies of a Violent Ideal in Western and Islamic Thought, published by Oxford University Press in Fall 2018. This book deconstructs dominant formulations of peace in the writings of Plato, al-Farabi, Aquinas, Erasmus, Grotius, Gentili, Hobbes, Ibn Khaldun, Immanuel Kant, and Sayyid Qutb.

    Murad Idris
    University of Virginia
    Department of Politics

    04:00 PM - 06:00 PM
    Centre for Ethics, University of Toronto
    200 Larkin

  • Tue, Nov 27, 2018
    Ethics of AI in Context
    Ethics of AI in Context: Regina Rini & Leah Cohen

    Deepfakes, Deep Harms

    Imagine that an online video appears, showing you doing or saying something you would never do. You know it is fake, but not everyone believes you. This scenario may soon be possible, thanks to the use of machine learning to fabricate convincing video and audio recordings, so-called ‘deepfakes’. We look ahead to the dangers of this technology, distinguishing the variety of ways it can harm or wrong people: material, reputational, and existential.

    Regina Rini & Leah Cohen
    York University
    Philosophy


    04:00 PM - 06:00 PM
    Centre for Ethics, University of Toronto
    200 Larkin

  • Wed, Nov 28, 2018
    Ethics at Noon
    Ethics@Noon: John Enman-Beech

    Contract as an Ethical Frame for Employment, Tenancy, and Consumption

    What happens when we think employment, tenancy, and consumption (ETC) through the ethical frame of contract? This frame sees ETC as a collection of individual deals that assign obligations to the deals’ parties. The ETC system is justified if the individual deals are justified, and a deal is justified if it is the product of voluntary and informed agreement. But deals are rarely if ever fully voluntary and informed in ETC. This calls the contractual frame into question, but it continues to be used everywhere, from legal doctrine to economic analysis to political rhetoric to individuals’ conceptions of their relationships to their cell providers. My hypothesis: contract perversely conscripts people into choosing and re-choosing the existing social order, entrenching patterns of preferences and entitlements, and thereby (through people’s desire to feel in control of their choices) to identify with their roles.

    John Enman-Beech
    Centre for Ethics, University of Toronto
    Doctoral Fellow

    12:30 PM - 02:00 PM
    Centre for Ethics, University of Toronto
    200 Larkin

  • Mon, Jan 14, 2019
    Perspectives on Ethics
    Perspectives on Ethics: Bonnie Honig

    Bonnie Honig
    Brown University
    Nancy Duke Lewis Professor of Modern Culture and Media and Political Science & Interim Director, Pembroke Center for Teaching and Research on Women

    04:00 PM - 06:00 PM
    Centre for Ethics, University of Toronto
    200 Larkin

  • Tue, Jan 15, 2019
    Ethics of AI in Context
    Ethics of AI in Context: Michael Kearns

    Michael Kearns
    University of Pennsylvania
    Computer Science

    04:00 PM - 06:00 PM
    Centre for Ethics, University of Toronto
    200 Larkin

  • Wed, Jan 16, 2019
    Ethics at Noon
    Ethics@Noon: Patti Tamara Lenard

    Patti Tamara Lenard
    University of Ottawa
    Graduate School of Public and International Affairs

    12:30 PM - 02:00 PM
    Centre for Ethics, University of Toronto
    200 Larkin

  • Mon, Jan 28, 2019
    Perspectives on Ethics
    Perspectives on Ethics: Rachel Nolan

    Rachel Nolan
    Columbia University
    Center for the Study of Ethnicity and Race

    04:00 PM - 06:00 PM
    Centre for Ethics, University of Toronto
    200 Larkin

  • Tue, Jan 29, 2019
    Ethics of AI in Context
    Ethics of AI in Context: Kelly Hannah-Moffat

    Kelly Hannah-Moffat
    University of Toronto
    Criminology & Sociolegal Studies

    04:00 PM - 06:00 PM
    Centre for Ethics, University of Toronto
    200 Larkin

  • Wed, Jan 30, 2019
    Ethics at Noon
    Ethics@Noon: Brian Price

    Brian Price
    University of Toronto
    Cinema Studies

    12:30 PM - 02:00 PM
    Centre for Ethics, University of Toronto
    200 Larkin

  • Tue, Feb 12, 2019
    Ethics of AI in Context
    Ethics of AI in Context: Sheila McIlraith

    Sheila McIlraith
    University of Toronto
    Computer Science

    04:00 PM - 06:00 PM
    Centre for Ethics, University of Toronto
    200 Larkin

  • Wed, Feb 13, 2019
    Ethics at Noon
    Ethics@Noon: Ashley Rubin

    Ashley Rubin
    University of Toronto
    Sociology

    12:30 PM - 02:00 PM
    Centre for Ethics, University of Toronto
    200 Larkin

  • Tue, Feb 26, 2019
    Ethics of AI in Context
    Ethics of AI in Context: Chelsea Barabas

    Chelsea Barabas
    MIT
    Media Lab


    04:00 PM - 06:00 PM
    Centre for Ethics, University of Toronto
    200 Larkin

  • Wed, Feb 27, 2019
    Ethics at Noon
    Ethics@Noon: Thilo Schaefer

    Thilo Schaefer
    Centre for Ethics, University of Toronto
    Doctoral Fellow

    12:30 PM - 02:00 PM
    Centre for Ethics, University of Toronto
    200 Larkin

  • Mon, Mar 4, 2019
    Perspectives on Ethics
    Perspectives on Ethics: Jennifer Morton

    Jennifer Morton
    City College of New York
    Philosophy

    04:00 PM - 06:00 PM
    Centre for Ethics, University of Toronto
    200 Larkin

  • Wed, Mar 13, 2019
    Ethics at Noon
    Ethics@Noon: Tom Parr

    Tom Parr
    University of Essex
    Department of Government

    12:30 PM - 02:00 PM
    Centre for Ethics, University of Toronto
    200 Larkin

  • Wed, Mar 27, 2019
    Ethics at Noon
    Ethics@Noon: Benjamin Berger

    Benjamin Berger
    York University
    Osgoode Hall Law School

    12:30 PM - 02:00 PM
    Centre for Ethics, University of Toronto
    200 Larkin

  • Thu, Jun 27, 2019
    Events on Campus
    Media Ethics: Human Ecology in a Connected World

    The 20th Annual Convention of the Media Ecology Association
    International Conference
    Toronto, 27-30 June 2019

    Presented by:

    12:00 AM - 11:59 PM
    St Michael's College
    81 St. Mary Street

Past Events