Events @ C4E

This Week’s Events

<< Previous weekNext week >>Sunday, February 11, 2024 -- Saturday, February 17, 2024

Luke Davies, Aiding the Impermissible: Kant and the Morality of Assisted Dying

Monday, February 12, 2024 - 04 pm - 06 pm

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Aiding the Impermissible: Kant and the Morality of Assisted Dying
Kant’s claim suicide is in every case contrary to moral duty makes him an unlikely figure to turn to when mounting a defence of physician-assisted dying (PAD). This is because it is plausible to assume that the permissibility of suicide in at least some cases is a necessary condition for support of PAD.
The aim of this talk is to suggest an alternative to this picture. I argue that Kant’s account of moral virtue and the duties we have towards the moral perfection of others are both compatible with a commitment to PAD. The prohibition on suicide sets limits to the way in which this practice may be carried out but does not forbid it altogether. Moreover, I argue that there are good reasons to support the limits suggested by the Kantian view.
  ► this event is hybrid. Join in person at the Centre for Ethics (Larkin building, room 200) or online here.

 

Luke Davies University of Oxford Philosophy

 

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Brendan de Kenessey, Deontological Constraints as the Norms of Relationships

Wednesday, February 14, 2024 - 04 pm - 06 pm

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Deontological Constraints as the Norms of Relationships
I outline a novel theory of deontological constraints, based in the idea that these are the constraints we must abide by to participate well in interpersonal relationships. I understand deontological constraints as moral principles that forbid actions even when those actions cause no independent harm, or are even beneficial. Paradigm cases are the constraints against killing, promise-breaking, lying, stealing, and sexual assault. But why are these actions subject to constraints, rather than some other set? I suggest that we can explain the contours of constraints by looking at the nature of relationships. More specifically, I propose that relationships are best understood as activities of shared agency, and that if we unpack the norms one must obey to participate well in shared agency, we will find that these norms align neatly with the intuitive content of constraints. The upshot is that our reason to abide by constraints might be explained in terms of the value of interpersonal relationships.

► this event is in person at the Centre for Ethics (Larkin building, room 200).

 

Brendan de Kenessey
Philosophy
University of Toronto

 

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<< Previous weekNext week >>Sunday, February 11, 2024 -- Saturday, February 17, 2024