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CHAPTER 5

THE SOCIALIST-POPULIST IDEOLOGY I

FROM PATRICE LUMUMBA TO SAMORA MACHEL

The ideological deficiency, not to say the total lack of ideology, within the national liberation movements—which is basically due to ignorance of the historical reality which theses movements claim to transform—constitutes one of the greatest weaknesses of our struggle against imperialism, if not the greatest weakness of all . . . nobody has yet made a successful revolution without a revolutionary theory.

—Amilcar Cabral, *Revolution in Guinea*, 92–93

THE SOCIALIST-POPULIST AND POPULIST-SOCIALIST IDEOLOGIES

This chapter is a survey of the political, economic, social, and cultural dimensions of the socialist-populist ideology from a distinctly socialist perspective. The concept of "populist-socialism" is borrowed from Crawford Young, who states that this group "consists of states that espouse a socialist orientation but that either do not stress or expressly reject Marxism."[1] According to Young, populist socialism is a doctrine of development that characterized the "first wave" socialist regimes of the 1960s such as Algeria, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, and Tanzania. The author identifies five elements that define the populist-socialist perspective: (1) radical nationalism; (2) a radical mood; (3) anti-capitalism; (4) populism and an exaltation of the peasantry; and (5) adherence to a moderate form of socialism (or social democracy) and a rejection of orthodox Marxism.[2]

In fact, these rather broad and general characteristic features equally apply to the two categories introduced in this book—namely, the socialist-populist and the populist-socialist ideologies. In the first, we refer to political leaders (and regimes) strongly—but not exclusively—influenced by the Marxist-Leninist ideology. The statesmen affiliated with this ideology were either not in power at all or else ruled for only a short period of time. Furthermore, these leaders were unable or unwilling to exercise authoritarian rule, and they truly had the best interest of their people at heart. This category includes Patrice Lumumba (Congo), Ahmed Ben Bella (Algeria), Amilcar Cabral (Guinea-Bissau), Oginga Odinga (Kenya), Agostinho Neto (Angola), Samora Machel (Mozambique), and Robert Sobukwe (South Africa). This chapter shall focus exclusively on Lumumba, Ben Bella, Cabral, and Machel.

Note that in the socialist-populist ideology, the emphasis is on *socialist*, while in the populist-socialist ideology (which will be the subject of Chapter 7), the emphasis is on *populist*. Furthermore, in all these instances, the focus of our study is on the *political ideas* and the common themes that bind them rather than the individual leaders themselves. The chapter begins with an overview of the unfinished revolution in the Congo (1960–61) under the leadership of Patrice Emery Lumumba. It continues with an analysis of the Algerian revolution and the construction of socialism in Algeria by Ahmed Ben Bella. Next comes a study of the revolutionary theory and practice of Amical Cabral in Guinea-Bissau. The chapter ends with an overview of Samora Machel's Popular-Democratic government in Mozambique. Note that (except for the Congo), all the countries studied in this chapter achieved independence as a result of a long and protracted armed struggle.

PATRICE ÉMERY LUMUMBA

A Biographical Note

Patrice Émery Lumumba led the struggle for the independence of the Congo (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo) and became that country's first prime minister. His political murder just six months after independence made him a martyr of anticolonial resistance and a symbol of the African and Pan-African struggles throughout the world. Lumumba was born in 1925 in the district of Sankuru, Central Kasai province of the then Belgian Congo. In the course of his primary and secondary education, Lumumba became familiar with the writings of Karl Marx and Jean-Paul Sartre, which shaped his political ideas. He worked eleven years for the Belgian colonial service in the Congo, primarily in the post-office. As a member of the *évolués* (educated elite), Lumumba began writing and agitating for the Congolese anticolonial movement; he wrote articles for various anticolonial publications and was also active in a number of professional organizations. Lumumba's anticolonial activities brought him to the attention of the Belgian authorities, who sent him to Belgium in 1956 on a goodwill tour. The political reforms of 1957 led to the emergence of numerous political parties in 1958,

including the *Mouvement National Congolais* (MNC/Congolese National Movement)—the first truly nationalist, non-ethnic and non-regional Congolese party—which was led by Patrice Lumumba. That same year, a Brussels branch of *Présence Africaine*—a Paris-based African cultural society and journal—was established; this brought the Congolese intellectual elite (including Lumumba) in contact with African nationalist thought from the rest of the French-speaking countries and anticolonial leftist groups in Belgium.[3] In December 1958, Lumumba travelled to Accra (Ghana) to participate in the All-African Peoples Conference (AAPC) convened by Kwame Nkrumah. By April 1959, the MNC and other Congolese political parties demanded Congolese self-government by 1960. When rioting broke out in November 1959, Lumumba was held responsible, arrested, and sentenced to six months' imprisonment; he was released just in time to attend the Belgian-Congolese Round Table Conference in Brussels (Belgium) in January–February 1960.

As agreed at the conference, Congo became independent on June 30, 1960, following parliamentary elections in which the MNC obtained a majority of the votes. Patrice Lumumba became prime minister, while Joseph Kasa-Vubu (a moderate party leader close to the West) was named president of the new republic. However, within two weeks of the proclamation of independence, Lumumba was faced with both a nationwide mutiny of the army and a secessionist movement in the mining province of Katanga, both instigated by the Belgians, who intervened militarily on July 10, 1960. The events that followed may best be described as the first major crisis of decolonization in Africa. Lumumba successfully appealed to the United Nations (UN) Security Council to send a UN peacekeeping force to the Congo. However, the UN Secretary-General interpreted the UN mandate in accordance with Western—primarily Belgian and American—geo-strategic and economic interests, which, by that time, had decided that Lumumba had to be eliminated "by fair means or foul."[4] The Belgian-instigated and unconstitutional destitution of Lumumba by Kasa-Vubu on September 5, 1960, marked the beginning of a long period of constitutional, institutional, and political instability in the Congo, culminating in the assassination of Lumumba on January 17, 1961. Evidence has recently come to light that the Belgians actually planned and carried out the murder of Patrice Lumumba, with the help of their American allies and in the presence of Katangese government officials (notably Prime Minister Moïse Tshombe).[5]

The Unfinished Congolese Revolution

Patrice Lumumba's political ideas were not static; they evolved from a moderate to a radical position over the years. In a book published in 1961 (*Le Congo, terre d'avenir, est-il menaçé?*), he came through as a moderate liberal advocating minor reforms—rather than a complete overhaul—of the colonial system.[6] Writing in 1956, he developed such moderate themes as "Eurafrica, racial equality, status for the elite, and the Belgo-Congolese community."[7]

Greatly influenced by the political thought of Kwame Nkrumah and other radical African nationalist and Pan-Africanist leaders participating in the December 1958 All-African People's Conference (AAPC; Accra, Ghana) such as Frantz Fanon, Gamal Abdel Nasser, and Ahmed Sékou Touré, he brought back to the Congo new political ideas and a strong commitment to African nationalism and Pan-Africanism. In his speech at the Accra conference, Lumumba revealed some of these ideas, outlined in the MNC's program of action, which included the following priorities: independence, democracy, unity, and territorial integrity:

> The fundamental aim of our movement is to free the Congolese people from the colonialist regime and earn them their independence . . . We wish to see a modern democratic state established in our country, which will grant its citizen freedom, justice, social peace, tolerance, well-being, and equality, with no discrimination whatsoever . . . In our actions . . . we are against no one, *but rather are simply against domination, injustices, and abuses, and merely want to free ourselves of the shackles of colonialism and all its consequences* . . . Along with this struggle for national liberation waged *with calm and dignity, our movement opposes, with every power at its command, the balkanization of national territory under any pretext whatsoever.*"[8]

In the realm of culture, Lumumba called for a revalorization of African culture that, appropriately mixed with the positive elements of Western culture, would give rise to a new type of African civilization: "On the cultural plane, the new African states must make a serious effort to further African culture. We have a culture of our own, unparalleled moral and artistic values, an art of living and patterns of life that are ours alone. All these African splendors must be jealously preserved and developed. We will borrow from Western civilization what is good and beautiful and reject what is not suitable for us. This amalgam of African and European civilization will give Africa a civilization of a new type, an authentic civilization corresponding to African realities."[9] In terms of political organization, Lumumba advocated broad popular movements and unified political parties operating on the basis of internal democracy, with a constructive opposition and, eventually, a democratic political system based on pluralism: "In my view, there is only one way: bringing all Africans together in popular movements or unified parties . . . A genuine democracy will be at work within these parties and each one will have the satisfaction of expressing its opinions freely . . . The existence of an intelligent, dynamic, and constructive opposition is indispensable in order to counterbalance the political and administrative action of the government in power. But his moment does not appear to have arrived yet."[10] In foreign affairs, Lumumba—just like his political mentor Nkrumah—advocated a policy of nonalignment and "positive neutralism" vis-à-vis the two main politico-ideological blocs (East and West), a policy based on the specifically African ideology of the "African Personality": "Africa will tell the West that it wants the rehabilitation of Africa now, a return to the sources, the reinstitution of moral values; the African personality must express itself; that is what our policy of positive neutralism means . . . We have no intention of letting ourselves be guided by just any ideology. We have our own ideology, a strong ideology, a noble ideology, the affirmation of the African personality."[11] It was at the Pan-African Conference that he convened in Leopoldville (now Kinshasa; August 25–31, 1960) that Lumumba outlined his Pan-African project, the ideological cornerstone of his foreign policy. Having earlier declared that "the independence of the Congo represents a decisive step toward the liberation of the entire African continent," he went on to identify the various areas of African cooperation and integration, notably military cooperation, trade agreements, and cooperation in telecommunications and scientific research, concluding with the following call to action: "African unity and solidarity are no longer mere dreams; we must now embody them in concrete decisions."[12]

As noted before, Patrice Lumumba was only in power for six short months before falling prey to his sworn enemies, who had variously portrayed him as a racist, ultra-radical, dangerous "Communist," a Soviet stooge, and even as a "mad dog!"[13] He was thus unable to implement his ambitious political agenda.

AHMED BEN BELLA

A Biographical Note

Ahmed Ben Bella was born in Marnia (on the Moroccan-Algerian border) on December 25, 1916, into a peasant family. He was educated in Marnia and then attended secondary school in Tlemcen. Upon leaving school, Ben Bella did a variety of jobs before being called up for military service by the French government in 1937. During World War II, he served with distinction in the French Army, receiving many citations for valor. After the war's end (May 1945), he returned to Algeria and became active in various Algerian political movements agitating for independence, such as the *Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques* (MTLD/Movement for Democratic Freedoms) and its more radical offshoot, the *Organisation Spéciale* (OS/Special Organization). Ben Bella was one of nine "historic leaders" who, in November 1954, launched the Algerian war of liberation spearheaded by the *Front de Libération Nationale* (FNL/National Liberation Front) and its armed wing, the *Armée de Libération Nationale* (ANL/National Liberation Army). In October 1956, he was detained in Algiers by the French authorities and imprisoned in France for six years. In 1958, while still in detention, he was appointed vice-chairman of the *Gouvernment Provisoire de la République Algérienne* (GPRA/Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic), the Algerian government-in-exile. After the Evian Peace Accords (March 1962) formally ended the war, Ahmed Ben Bella became prime minister of the Democratic People's Republic of Algeria proclaimed in September 1962 and president of the republic in 1963; the FLN was then declared "the one and only party of progress" and socialism became the state ideology. On

June 19, 1965, Ben Bella was overthrown by a military *coup d'état* led by his minister of defense, Colonel Houari Boumediennc. Detained until October 1980, he went into exile in Switzerland, only returning to Algeria in 1990. He died at his home in Algiers on April 11, 2012, at age 96.[14]

The Algerian Revolution and Algerian Socialism

Upon assuming power in 1962, Ahmed Ben Bella proclaimed "Algerian Socialism" to be the official state ideology; thus he declared, "We want an Algerian socialism which is based on our own experience and, at the same time, also draws on that of the socialist countries."[15] While evidently influenced by Western ideologies—such as Marxism and Socialism—Ben Bella's concept of Algerian Socialism was also firmly grounded in moral values derived from a (racially and ethnically) inclusive and broadly conceived Arab culture and civilization: "I have a way of acting and thinking in life, a certain ethic, a definite heritage of culture and civilization, a specific type of humanism and certain moral values."[16] Observing that in Algeria the peasantry constitutes the core of the "revolutionary masses," Ben Bella advocated a comprehensive program of agrarian reform driven by and directly benefiting the peasantry: "We wish to promote agricultural reform from below so that the peasant masses may be involved and participate directly in its [implementation] through large-scale movements in the countryside."[17] As a result, former French agricultural estates were reorganized into large-scale self-managed units. At the same time, an *Office National de la Réforme Agraire* (ONRA) was created.[18] Politically, Ben Bella favored a single party, the FLN (National Liberation Front), which he invited the members of all the other parties and movements to join.[19] Denouncing neocolonialism—defined as the "modernization" of colonialism after independence—as "our greatest scourge" and "a new form of slavery," Ben Bella advocated neutralism as the cornerstone of Algeria's foreign policy.[20] Article 2 of the Algerian Constitution stated, "Algeria is an integral part of the Arab Maghreb, of the Arab world, and of Africa;" it practices "positive neutralism and non-engagement." Ben Bella was a committed Pan-Africanist, and Algeria became a founding member of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) on May 25, 1963. Algeria concretely manifested its support for the African liberation movements of Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and South Africa by providing them with military assistance, logistical support, and training facilities. The October–November 1963 border war between Algeria and Morocco was eventually resolved by an OAU mediation led by Malian president Modibo Kéïta at the Bamako Conference of October 29–30, 1963.

Ben Bella firmly believed that the Algerian state should control the "commanding heights" of the economy and thus initiated—through the decrees of March and October 1963—a policy of nationalization of the agricultural and industrial sectors. Furthermore, Ben Bella was convinced that real economic independence—characterized by full control over natural resources and a comprehensive industrialization program—could only be achieved

by a close cooperation between less-developed countries, as exemplified by OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries). Algeria, Ben Bella declared, would take the lead in this process, first by providing natural gas to Morocco, Tunisia, and other African countries; then by setting aside a portion of its oil and gas revenues for the financing of development projects in the Maghreb and in other African countries.[21] Did the overthrow of Ben Bella in June 1965 have anything to do with this bold policy of South-South cooperation, which ran counter to the interests of the major Western transnational oil corporations then operating in Algeria? One can only speculate!

Toward the end of his brief 21-month tenure, Ben Bella became progressively estranged from his former companions—notably, Mohamed Boudiaf, Mohammed Khider, and Hocine Aït Ahmed—who all joined the opposition to his regime.[22] Furthermore, there is some evidence that Ben Bella's rule became increasingly personal, exclusive, and authoritarian. In Alistair Horne's words, "Ben Bella veered more and more towards measures of abstract socialism, more and more towards authoritarianism and the 'cult of personality.'"[23] In the end, he was the victim of the military elite on whom he increasingly relied and that continues to rule the country to this day.

AMILCAR CABRAL

A Biographical Note

Born in Bafata (Guinea-Bissau) on September 12, 1924, Amilcar Lopes Cabral was a man of many talents, at one and the same time poet, agronomist, intellectual, theoretician, revolutionary, political organizer, and diplomat. After attending school in the Cape Verde, he went on to study agronomy and hydraulic engineering at the *Instituto Superior de Agronomia* (Advanced School of Agronomy) in Lisbon. While in Portugal, he helped establish in 1951 the *Centro de Estudos Africanos* (Center for African Studies), advocating a "return to the source," a reclaiming of African culture and history, and a "re-Africanization of the mind." In Lisbon, Cabral's circle of African friends included Mario de Andrade, Agostinho Neto, Marcelino dos Santos, and Eduardo dos Santos. In 1952, Cabral returned to Portuguese Guinea as an agricultural engineer and was tasked with the colony's first agricultural census; this gave him a unique opportunity to get intimately acquainted with the land, its people, and its problems. In September 1956, he founded—with his brother Luis Cabral, Aristides Pereira, and others—a national liberation movement, the *Partido Africano da Idependencia da Guiné e Cabo Verde* (PAIGC/African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde). After an extensive period of training and political education, the armed struggle began in January 1963. It was so successful that by 1969 the PAIGC controlled two-thirds of the territory. Unfortunately, Cabral did not live to see Guinea-Bissau's independence; he was assassinated in Conakry (Guinea) by Portuguese agents on January 20, 1973. Following a military coup d'état in Lisbon that ended the Portuguese dictatorship, Guinea-Bissau became

independent on September 10, 1974, with Luis Cabral (Amilcar's brother) as its first president.[24]

Revolutionary Theory and Practice in Guinea-Bissau

For Amilcar Cabral, theory and practice were inextricably linked; like two sides of the same coin, one does not go without the other. Furthermore, he argued that an ideology—or revolutionary theory—was essential for any national liberation movement to succeed and that ideology is precisely what was most lacking in these movements: "The ideological deficiency, not to say the total lack of ideology, within the national liberation movements . . . constitutes one of the greatest weaknesses of our struggle against imperialism, if not the greatest weakness of all . . . nobody has yet made a successful revolution without a revolutionary theory."[25] In addition, Cabral points out that each national liberation and social revolution has its own specific characteristics grounded in its particular historical situation and circumstances: "National liberation and social revolution are not exportable commodities; they are . . . the outcome of local and national elaboration, more or less influenced by external factors . . . but essentially determined and formed by the historical reality of each people."[26] Commenting on the nature of the PAIGC, Basil Davidson emphasizes this crucial point: "The PAIGC is a revolutionary movement based on an analysis of social reality *in Guiné*: revolutionary precisely and above all because its guiding lines are drawn from totally indigenous circumstances."[27] Cabral argues (like Frantz Fanon) that because of the violence inherent in colonial and neocolonial rule, national liberation movements must necessarily resort to violence: "The essential instrument of imperialist domination is violence . . . there is not, and cannot be national liberation without the use of liberating violence by the nationalist forces, to answer the criminal violence of the agents of imperialism."[28]

Central to Cabral's concept of national liberation is the notion of "return to the source"—namely, the right of a people to reclaim their culture and history: "The national liberation of a people is the regaining of the historical personality of that people, its return to history through the destruction of the imperialist domination to which it was subjected."[29] Basil Davidson puts it succinctly: "Hence the concept of national liberation was to be defined not so much as the right of a people to rule itself, but as the right of a people to regain its own history."[30] Pushing the argument one step further, Cabral argued that because cultural oppression is a key element of imperialist domination, national liberation is essentially an act of cultural liberation on the part of the people: "If imperialist domination has the vital need to practice cultural oppression, national liberation is necessarily an act of culture . . . we may consider the national liberation movement as the organized political expression of the culture of the people who are undertaking the struggle."[31]

At independence, the African states and leaders face a stark ideological choice—either capitalism or socialism: "There are only two possible paths for an independent nation: to return to imperialist domination (neo-colonialism, capitalism, state capitalism), or to take the way of socialism."[32] Cabral's vision of the ideal future society implied the liberation of people from oppression, exploitation, and poverty, leading to the creation of a "new man" and a "new society." As Lars Rudebeck succinctly puts it, "The long-term, overriding goal of the PAIGC has always been the socialist ideal of ending—once and for all—'the exploitation of man by man' . . . From this perspective, socialism is synonymous with human emancipation and liberation from exploitation."[33] Similarly, Patrick Chabal observes that while Cabral's "analysis of history, development and society are predicated on a Marxist framework, . . . he found little inspiration in Marxism for his work as an African nationalist and was thus forced to step outside accepted social and political theories."[34] Chabal argues that Cabral was, above all, a nationalist, a realist, a pragmatist, and a humanist: "Cabral was first and foremost a nationalist. Nationalism, not communism, was his cause. But he was also a humanist, a socialist and above all, a pragmatist. His political values were largely based on moral commitments . . . The other key aspect of his personality was his deep commitment to humanist ideals and his direct concern for human beings, especially the oppressed and the down-trodden."[35] Politically, Cabral favored direct democracy through decentralized regional assemblies, and he viewed the village councils as a grassroots base of society. The model of development envisaged by Cabral, sometimes referred to as "developmental nationalism," was based on self-reliance, meeting the people's basic needs, and a decentralized, people-centered, and bottom-up type of decision making.[36] Unfortunately, Cabral did not live to implement his vision of the ideal polity and society. However, he left these words of wisdom as his intellectual testament to the people of Guinea-Bissau and Africa: "Always bear in mind that the people are not fighting for ideas . . . They are fighting to win material benefits, to live better and in peace, to see their lives go forward, to guarantee the future of their children . . . Create schools and spread education in all liberated areas . . . Hide nothing from the masses of our people. Tell no lies. Expose lies whenever they are told. Mask no difficulties, mistakes, failures. Claim no easy victory."[37]

SAMORA M. MACHEL

A Biographical Note

Born in the Chokwe district of Gaza province on September 29, 1933, Samora Moïses Machel was one of the main leaders of the liberation struggle in Mozambique (with Eduardo Mondlane) and a foremost African revolutionary thinker and strategist. After nursing training, Machel joined the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) at its creation in June 1962 as well as the armed struggle against Portuguese colonialism initiated in September 1964. Machel took overall command of the guerilla forces in 1966; he became secretary of defense and, in May 1970, president of FRELIMO following the assassination of Eduardo Mondlane in February 1969.

After the collapse of dictatorship in Portugal, FRELIMO signed the Lusaka Accord of September 1974 that led, on June 25, 1975, to the formal independence of Mozambique from Portugal, with Samora Machel as president. With an economy in ruins, the top priority of his government was the provision of basic services, notably education and health care.

The advent of the white minority regime of Ian Smith in neighboring Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) (1965–80) significantly handicapped Mozambique's development. Smith (and South Africa) supported a reactionary movement, the Mozambique National Resistance Movement (RENAMO). After the advent of majority rule in Zimbabwe, Machel drafted an ambitious ten-year plan and took part in the creation of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) to reduce economic dependence on South Africa. Machel began moving away from doctrinaire Marxism toward a more mixed economy. As RENAMO's insurgency increased, Mozambique—which also provided sanctuary to the African National Congress (ANC)—descended into civil war, and the economy further deteriorated. This forced Machel to negotiate and sign the Nkomati Accord with South Africa, by which both countries agreed to expel ANC and RENAMO fighters from their territories. Returning from a Front-Line States summit in Zambia on October 19, 1986, Samora Machel was killed in a plane crash just inside the South African border. It has since been revealed that a South African radar manipulation actually led to the fatal crash.[38]

The Popular-Democratic Revolution in Mozambique

The political ideas of Samora Machel and Amilcar Cabral are strikingly similar. This is due to the fact that both leaders—plus the leader of Angola's liberation movement, Agostinho Neto—faced the same enemy: an extremely backward, reactionary, dictatorial, and exploitative Portuguese regime that depended on its colonies for its economic survival. As noted before, students from all the Portuguese colonies studying in Lisbon in the early 1950s socialized (and exchanged ideas) within such institutions as the Center for African Studies; they also participated in—and were deeply influenced by—the Portuguese anticolonial movement spearheaded by the Communist Party.

As was the case in the other Portuguese colonies (Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde, and Angola), the dialectical relationship between theory and practice was a key element of the liberation struggle in Mozambique: "Without revolutionary theory there is no revolutionary practice."[39] The point is made most emphatically by Machel in the following statement: "Ideology is always the result of a people's concrete revolutionary struggle; for this ideology to become real, it must be accepted and internalized by the broad masses; this is when theory is re-born and becomes embodied in the process of the daily struggle. This is the only way in which ideology is transformed into an irresistible material force which allows the people to overthrow the old order and to build the new society."[40] In fact, Machel attributed FRELIMO's success to "the priority of ideology." Once national unity within the liberation

movement has been achieved, Machel argued, ideology becomes essential in the planning of the new society: "Once these forces [for national liberation] are mobilized around the platform it is imperative to define their unity at the ideological level, to give them a clear and common perspective."[41] According to Machel, one of the key elements of this ideology is an inclusive, people-based nationalism transcending race, ethnicity, region, and religion: "No one can claim that they are representatives of a race, ethnic group, region or religious belief. They represent the working people . . . No one fought for a region, race, tribe or religion. We all fought and are still fighting for the same nation, for the single ideal of liberation of our land and our people."[42] The *people*, argues Machel, are front and center in the liberation struggle, and because in independent Mozambique sovereignty belongs to the *people*, it follows that the leaders should be in their service. Thus article 9 of FRELIMO's program hammered out at its First Congress (September 23–28, 1962) promised "to form a government of the people, by the people, and for the people in which sovereignty of the nation will reside in the will of the people."[43] Machel further elaborates on this important point: "Power belongs to the people. It has been won by the people and it must be exercised and defended by the people . . . Because power belongs to the people, those who exercise it are the servants of the people."[44]

As Marina and David Ottaway have aptly observed, "A socialist revolution, in Frelimo's view, could not take place immediately in Mozambique, but had to be preceded by two preliminary stages: a 'national democratic revolution' and a 'popular democratic revolution.' The first having been achieved with independence, Frelimo was now launching the popular democratic revolution devoted to the 'intensification of class struggle,' the creation of a 'New Man,' and the development of the economy under state control."[45] Indeed, the type of political system to be established by FRELIMO at independence may best be characterized as "popular-democratic," based on consensual, collective decision making and aimed at creating a "New Man": "We will thus establish true democracy throughout the country . . . FRELIMO's People's Democratic Government is also distinguished . . . by its collective working style, joint discussion and analysis of problems, mutual cooperation . . . We are engaged in a Revolution whose advance depends on the creation of the new man, with a new mentality. We are engaged in a Revolution aimed at the establishment of People's Democratic Power."[46] Machel makes a distinction between three aspects of democracy: political, military, and economic: "Political democracy is based on collective discussion, on a collective solution of our problems . . . Military democracy is ensured by the participation of everyone in absorbing our combat experience . . . Economic democracy is an integral part of our fight to destroy the system of exploitation of man."[47]

With regard to political organization, Machel emphasizes the primacy of politics over all other sectors; concretely, this means that it is the party that must guide government action: "Politics must guide government action . . . it is FRELIMO's political line . . . that must guide government action, FRELIMO that must orientate the government and the masses."[48] According

to Machel, there must be *internal democracy* within the party, based on the following principles: free discussion, collective decision making and responsibility, submission of the minority to the majority, and criticism and self-criticism.[49] Machel also emphasizes the point that the party's decisions must be genuinely democratic—that is, they must reflect the people's interests as well as involve the people in the decision-making process: "Our decisions must always be democratic in both content and form. Democratic in content means that they must reflect the real interests of the broad masses. Democratic in form means that the broad masses must take part in reaching a decision, feeling that it is theirs and not something imposed from above."[50] Machel advocates a self-reliant strategy of development in which priority is given to the agricultural sector, and industrialization is based on agriculture: "What can be done immediately by relying on one's own efforts should be analyzed in every productive unit, village, neighborhood, and family cell . . . Agriculture will therefore be the base of our development and industry its galvanizing factor. Industrial development must be based on the processing of our natural resources, which will make it possible to diversify and increase the value of exports."[51]

It is important to point out here that the particular historical circumstances of the liberation struggle in Mozambique had a major influence on the nature and *modus operandi* of FRELIMO as the embodiment of the interests, priorities, and needs of the peasant masses. Indeed, the front did not try to run the liberated zones from the top down; instead, it encouraged the peasants to organize themselves and elect their own leaders, relying on persuasion rather than coercion. Toward the end of the liberation struggle, the liberated zones covered one-fifth of the national territory, with a population of about 800,000. In these conditions, FRELIMO inevitably relied heavily on the peasants to run their own affairs, favoring a type of direct democracy. The key local unit created during the war was the *aldeia communal* (or communal village). Thus the experience of the Mozambican people during the war of liberation naturally led to FRELIMO's reliance on the communal villages to promote both participation and collectivization at independence. In a striking example of "grassroots" democracy at work, 894 "people's assemblies" were established at the local, district, municipal, provincial, and national levels in the elections of 1977 (September to December). In a rare example of direct democracy in Africa, the names of the candidates in this election were subject to public scrutiny at open meetings where villagers were invited to speak up and comment on the qualifications of the candidates.[52]

Finally, Machel held that particular attention should be given in an independent Mozambique to culture, education, training, primary health care, and the liberation of women, with particular focus on basic education and the promotion of literacy among the peasant masses.[53]

CONCLUSION

This chapter surveyed the political, social, and cultural dimensions of the socialist-populist ideology from a distinctly socialist perspective. The common characteristics of the leaders associated with this ideology are (1) their short tenure of office; (2) their preference for democratic governance; and (3) their populism, meaning that they have the best interest of their people at heart. A factor common to their countries is the fact that three of them (Algeria, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique) achieved independence as a result of an armed struggle.

Of all the leaders surveyed in this chapter, Patrice Lumumba was the one who ruled for the shortest time (just over six months), hence the subtitle "The Unfinished Congolese Revolution." This fact explains why his vision of a socialist society based on pluralism, a broad popular movement, internal democracy, and a Pan-African foreign policy never materialized. While Ahmed Ben Bella ruled a bit longer (two and a half years), it was not long enough to effect a substantial and lasting transformation of Algerian society. Ben Bella advocated a form of socialism based on Arab culture and civilization and on state control of the economy. He initiated agrarian reform and conducted a nonaligned, Pan-African foreign policy.

Amilcar Cabral and Samora Machel led the liberation struggle against Portuguese colonial rule in their respective countries, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique. Their common colonial experience explains why their political ideologies are so similar and emphasize the same themes:

1. *Ideology* being essential to the building of the new society
2. The need to link *theory* and *practice*
3. The primacy of the *political*
4. The need to *return to the source*, to retain African culture and history, and to create a "*new man*"
5. Acknowledging *the people* as the main actors and beneficiaries of the socialist revolution
6. Implementing direct, popular democracy through the agency of decentralized regional assemblies and village councils
7. Implementing a *self-reliant*, people-centered strategy of development

Unfortunately, the premature and untimely death of both Amilcar Cabral and Samora Machel did not enable them to fully implement the policies that they had begun to test on an experimental basis in the liberated areas of their respective countries.

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CHAPTER 6

THE SOCIALIST-POPULIST IDEOLOGY II

FROM KWAME NKRUMAH TO JULIUS NYERERE

The basis of colonial territorial dependence is economic, but the basis of the solution of the problem is political. Hence political independence is an indispensable step towards securing economic emancipation.

—Kwame Nkrumah, *Towards Colonial Freedom*, xv

INTRODUCTION

This chapter continues the survey—started in Chapter 5—of the political, economic, social, and cultural dimensions of the socialist-populist ideology from a distinctly socialist perspective. It shall focus on the statesmen (and regimes) who, in spite of their socialist rhetoric, have used the socialist-populist ideology as an instrument of control and coercion and sometimes—as in the case of Guinea's Sékou Touré—even as an instrument of terror. These political systems are characterized by relatively authoritarian (sometimes totalitarian) regimes, a top-down system of administration, as well as state control over the economy. Gamal Abdel Nasser (Egypt), Kwame Nkrumah (Ghana), Ahmed Sékou Touré (Guinea), Modibo Kéïta (Mali), and Julius Nyerere (Tanzania) all fall in this category. It is important to note in this regard that there is a significant difference of degree between these leaders in terms of the authoritarian vs. democratic nature of their regimes. Thus the most autocratic and authoritarian (even totalitarian) tendencies were exhibited by Sékou Touré and Kwame Nkrumah (more pronounced in the former than in the latter), while Modibo Kéïta and Julius K. Nyerere were somewhat more liberal, open, and democratic in their exercise of power (Nyerere more so than Kéïta).

As we have noted in the previous chapter, in the socialist-populist ideology the emphasis is on *socialist*, while in the populist-socialist ideology (which will be the subject of Chapter 7) the emphasis is on *populist*. Furthermore, in all these instances, the focus of our study is on the *political ideas* and the common themes that bind them rather than the individual leaders themselves. This chapter begins with a study of the "Father of African Nationalism," Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, whose influential political ideas are encapsulated in the concept of the "African Personality." The chapter then surveys the political ideas and policies of two key proponents of "African Socialism" in Francophone Africa: Ahmed Sékou Touré of Guinea and Modibo Kéïta of Mali. The chapter concludes with a survey of the political ideology and policies of another prominent advocate of "African Socialism," *Mwalimu* Julius K. Nyerere of Tanzania.

Problems of ideology and political organization were foremost in the minds of most African leaders in the immediate pre- and postindependence period. These leaders were of the opinion that such problems should be tackled before any attempt to solve economic problems could be envisaged. Nkrumah makes the point succinctly: "The basis of colonial territorial dependence is *economic*, but the basis of the solution of the problem is *political*. Hence *political independence* is an indispensable step towards securing economic emancipation."[1] Such is also the meaning of Kwame Nkrumah's famous motto: "Seek ye first the political kingdom, and everything shall be added unto it." For these leaders, the economic policy should result from a consistent political ideology, and not the reverse. The two most prominent proponents of this view in West Africa were Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah and Guinea's Ahmed Sékou Touré.

KWAME NKRUMAH

A Biographical Note

Francis Nwia Kofi Kwame Nkrumah—Pan-Africanist, one of the founders of the Organization of African Unity, and the first leader of independent Ghana—was born in September 1909 (day unknown) in Nkroful, Nzima region, in southwestern Gold Coast. He was educated first at local missionary schools, then at Achimota College, graduating as a teacher in 1930. In 1935, Nkrumah travelled to the United States to study at Lincoln University. He then pursued graduate studies at the University of Pennsylvania. From 1943 to 1945, he taught at Lincoln and served as president of the African Students Association of the United States and Canada. During his ten-year stay in the United States, Nkrumah became familiar with the writings of such African American scholar-activists as W. E. B. Du Bois and Marcus Garvey, who inspired his ideas about Pan-Africanism; he also socialized with (and learned political organization from) prominent Caribbean activists such as C. L. R. James and George Padmore. In 1945, Nkrumah went to London, presumably to study at the London School of Economics and Political

Science (LSE). There, he became active in (and vice-president of) the West African Students' Union (WASU). Nkrumah also played a prominent role in the organization of the Fifth Pan-African Congress in Manchester (October 15–19, 1945), acting as co-treasurer (with George Padmore). This also gave Nkrumah an opportunity to get acquainted with other African nationalist leaders such as Peter Abrahams (South Africa), Obafemi Awolowo (Nigeria), Hastings K. Banda (Malawi), and Jomo Kenyatta (Kenya). W. E. B. Du Bois and C. L. R. James were also in attendance. Following the congress, Nkrumah was one of the founders and general-secretary of the West African National Secretariat aiming at a "United West African Independence."

In 1947, Nkrumah left Britain and returned to the Gold Coast to become secretary-general of the newly-created, anti-colonial United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC). In 1948, following his arrest and detention as a result of labor unrest, Nkrumah left the UGCC over political differences, and in June 1949, he founded his own radical nationalist political party, the Convention People's Party (CPP), which demanded "full Self-Government now!" In 1950, the CPP campaign of "positive action" led to strikes and demonstrations throughout the colony. The colonial authorities declared a state of emergency, and Nkrumah was, once again, arrested and detained. Released from prison in 1951, Nkrumah became leader of government business the same year and prime minister from 1952. The CPP won comfortable majorities in the general elections of 1951, 1954, and 1956. Nkrumah led the country to "internal self-government" and, eventually, to formal independence in March 1957. Nkrumah became Ghana's first president and was re-elected unopposed in 1965 He was overthrown by a military coup d'état on February 24, 1966, while on a trip abroad and went into exile in Guinea, where Sekou Toure made him honorary co-president. After some years of ill health, Nkrumah died of cancer in Bucharest (Romania) on April 27, 1972. In 1994, he received an official re-burial in a special mausoleum in Accra.[2]

African Socialism and *CONSCIENCISM*

Nkrumah's definition of *ideology* differs somewhat from the conventional one, according to which an ideology is a body of writing of one individual, or a small group of individuals, directed only at radical change in a society. For Nkrumah, "an ideology, even when it is revolutionary, does not merely express the wish that a present social order should be abolished. It seeks also to defend and maintain the new social order which it introduces."[3] He also views ideology and practice as being inextricably (even dialectically) linked: "Practice without thought is blind; thought without practice is empty."[4]

The intellectual eclecticism of Kwame Nkrumah is evident from the following remarks by Thomas Hodgkin, a British scholar who was also a friend and political adviser of the late president: "He had . . . the kind of intellect at the same time organizing and practical, which enabled him to search and turn to practical use, bits of theories that came his way and seemed likely to fit the context of the Gold Coast—collecting ideas and storing them against

the future as a squirrel collects and store nuts. The essential eclecticism of this approach is worth stressing."[5] It is necessary to refer to Nkrumah's *Autobiography* to trace the evolution of his political thought. From his political awakening to his overthrow, the constant and most prominent feature in Nkrumah's character was his staunch, unremitting, and truly passionate *nationalism*. The formulation of his strong resentment against colonialism dates from as far back as his years as a student in America: "Independence for the Gold Coast was my aim. It was a colony and I have always regarded colonialism as the policy by which a foreign power binds territories to herself by political ties with the primary object of promoting her own economic advantage."[6] Nkrumah observes that nationalism constitutes only one stage in the liberation struggle, whose ultimate goal is the achievement of Pan-Africanism and Socialism: "The nationalist phase is a necessary step in the liberation struggle, but must never be regarded as the final solution to the problem raised by the economic and political exploitation of our peoples."[7]

While in London, Nkrumah devoted much of his time and energy to the study and practice of socialism and Pan-Africanism. He mentions the political writers who inspired him in the shaping of his own political thought as being "Hegel, Karl Marx, Engels, Lenin and Mazzini. The writings of these men did much to influence me in my revolutionary ideas and activities, and Karl Marx and Lenin particularly impressed me as I felt sure that their philosophy was capable of solving these problems."[8] The question of whether Nkrumah was a convinced Marxist has perplexed Ghana scholars for some time. In fact, Nkrumah views Marxism more as a tool to be adapted to specific local conditions than as an end in itself. Hence his emphasis on the *practical* side rather than on the theoretical aspects of Marxism: "My aim was to learn the technique of organization . . . I know that whatever the program for the solution of the colonial question might be, success would depend upon the organization adopted. I concentrated on finding a formula by which the whole colonial question and the problem of imperialism could be solved."[9] This formula was Marxism-Leninism. Later, Nkrumah would remind the cadres of the party, "Let us not forget that Marxism is not a dogma but a guide to action."[10] It is probably the Marxist analysis of imperialism—and particularly Lenin's characterization of imperialism as "the highest stage of capitalism"—that Nkrumah found most convincing as he reflected on imperialism's impact on Africa: "The most searching and penetrating analysis of economic imperialism has been given by Marx and Lenin."[11] It is interesting to note in this regard that Nkrumah deliberately paraphrased Lenin in the subtitle of his book *Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism*, published in 1965.[12]

Criticizing the "muddled thinking" about African socialism, Nkrumah observed that "there is only one true socialism and that is *scientific socialism*, the principles of which are abiding and universal." He went on to summarize socialism as "(1) Common ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange . . . (2) Planned methods of production by the state, based on modern industry and agriculture. (3) Political power in the hands of the people . . . in keeping with the humanist and egalitarian spirit

which characterized African traditional society . . . (4) Application of scientific methods in all spheres of thought and production."[13] Another important aspect of Nkrumah's political thought that developed during these days was his strong Pan-Africanism. He himself admits that "of all the literature that I studied, the book that did more than any other to fire my enthusiasm was *Philosophy and Opinions of Marcus Garvey* published in 1923."[14] Since this dimension of Nkrumah's political thought has been abundantly documented in Chapter 4, it is not necessary to elaborate on it further at this point. Suffice it to note here Nkrumah's deep conviction that the independence of Ghana would be incomplete and meaningless unless it is linked with the liberation of the whole African continent. For him, African unity implied that (1) imperialism and foreign oppression should be eradicated in all their forms, (2) neocolonialism should be recognized and eliminated, and (3) the new African nation must develop within a continental framework.[15]

There are strong indications in Nkrumah's thought of the influence of Christian ethics that were impressed on him while a student of theology at Lincoln Seminary in the United States. Nkrumah is at great pains to demonstrate that his philosophy of "Consciencism"—defined as "a philosophy and ideology for decolonization"—and religion are not necessarily inconsistent: "Philosophical consciencism, even though deeply rooted in materialism, is not necessarily atheistic."[16] In his *Autobiography*, he describes himself as "a non-denominational Christian and a Marxist socialist," and, he adds, "I have not found any contradiction between the two."[17]

In his book *Consciencism*, Nkrumah identifies the three main segments of African society, animated by competing ideologies, as being the traditional, the Western, and the Islamic. As a result, Nkrumah argues, a new ideology reflecting the unity of society, based on indigenous humanist African principles and catering to the needs of all, needs to emerge. Such an ideology he names *philosophical consciencism*:

> There are three broad features to be distinguished here. African society has one segment which comprises our traditional way of life; it has a second segment which is filled by the presence of the Islamic tradition in Africa; it has a final segment which represents the infiltration of the Christian tradition and culture of Western Europe into Africa . . . These different segments are animated by competing ideologies . . . A new emergent ideology is therefore required, . . . an ideology which will not abandon the original humanist principles of Africa . . . Such a philosophical statement I propose to name *philosophical consciencism*, for it will give the theoretical basis for an ideology whose aim shall be to contain the African experience of Islamic and Euro-Christian presence as well as the experience of the traditional African society, and, by gestation, employ them for the harmonious growth and development of that society.[18]

This approach has, more recently, been popularized in African studies by Ali A. Mazrui through his concept of "*Triple Heritage*," introduced in his television series and companion volumes titled *The Africans*, and refers to the fact

that "three civilizations have helped to shape contemporary Africa: Africa's rich indigenous inheritance, Islamic culture, and the impact of Western traditions and lifestyles."[19]

In his struggle for Ghana's independence, Nkrumah found an important source of inspiration in the method of "non-violence" used by Mahatma Gandhi in his own struggle for India's independence. When Gandhi died, Nkrumah acknowledged that "we too mourned his death, for he had inspired us deeply with his political thought, notably with his adherence to non-violent resistance."[20] It is from Gandhi's concept of "non-violent resistance" that Nkrumah derived his own "Positive Action," which he evolved when organizing the Convention People's Party (CPP) in the struggle against British colonial rule. What he meant by "Positive Action" was "employing legitimate agitation, newspaper and political educational campaigns and the application of strikes, boycotts and non-cooperation based on the principle of non-violence."[21]

Nkrumah's conception of the party and the state is informed by the—distinctly Leninist—view of the preeminence of politics over economics, both in the liberation struggle and in the building up of the socialist state. Such is the meaning of the CPP early slogan (paraphrasing the Bible) "Seek ye first the political kingdom, and everything shall be added unto it." The CPP operates according to the Leninist principle of "Democratic Centralism," which Nkrumah defines as follows: "All are free to express their views. But once a majority decision is taken, we expect such a decision to be loyally executed, even by those who might have opposed that decision. This we consider and proclaim to be the truest form of Democratic Centralism—decisions freely arrived at and loyally executed. This applies from the lowest to the highest level. None is privileged and no one shall escape disciplinary action."[22] Nkrumah views the state as the main instrument of the building up of socialism in Ghana, eventually becoming "the state of all the people.": "In Marxism the State is the instrument of class dictatorship. While admitting the essential truth of this view, 'Consciencism' holds that the State is the great regulator of human behavior."[23]

In the final analysis, Nkrumah's essential political philosophy, variously labeled as "Consciencism" or "Nkrumaism," may best be characterized as "African socialism"—namely, socialism adapted to African indigenous culture and society seen as essentially classless, communal, and egalitarian:

> I would define *Nkrumaism* as a non-atheistic socialist philosophy which seeks to apply the current socialist ideas to the solution of our problems . . . by adapting these ideas to the realities of our everyday life. It is basically socialism adapted to suit the conditions and circumstances of Africa . . . The African traditional social system is basically communalistic, i.e. socialistic—a society in which the welfare of the individual is bound up with the welfare of all the people in the community. For this reason *Nkrumaism* is a socialist idea and way of life that is completely at home in Africa.[24]

Ultimately, Nkrumah's whole political philosophy revolves around the central concept of *the people*. Indeed, he views African socialism as a means of not only liberating the people from the shackles of imperialism but also—politically, economically, socially, and culturally—empowering the people after independence: "The liberation of a people institutes principles which enjoin the recognition and destruction of imperialistic domination, whether it is political, economic, social or cultural . . . The true welfare of a people does not admit of compromise . . . Independence once won, . . . it is not really possible to rule against the wish and interest of the people . . . The people are the backbone of positive action . . . The people are the reality of national greatness."[25]

AHMED SÉKOU TOURÉ

A Biographical Note

Ahmed Sékou Touré—generally referred to as Sékou Touré—was arguably one of the most controversial African leaders of the postcolonial era. Revered by some as a hero of independence and as one of the "Fathers of African Nationalism and Pan-Africanism" alongside Kwame Nkrumah—to whom he was extremely close, both personally and ideologically—he was despised by others as a brutal and ruthless autocrat and tyrant who mercilessly threw thousands of Guineans in prison and systematically eliminated any Guinean intellectual or politician whom he perceived as a threat to his rule. Sékou Touré was also one of the longest serving African presidents, having been in power for 26 years (1958–84)

Born in Farannah (northern Guinea) on January 9, 1922, in what was then French West Africa into a family of poor peasant farmers, Sékou Touré claimed to descend from the late-nineteenth-century West African Muslim reformer and empire-builder Almamy Samory Touré (a claim never convincingly proven). Educated first in local schools, he went in 1936 on to attend secondary school in Conakry (*École Georges Poiret*), from which he was expelled in 1937 for organizing a student food strike. Having completed his secondary education through correspondence courses, he joined the colonial post and telecommunications administration in 1941. In 1945, he founded the Post and Telecommunications Workers' Union (SPTT, the first trade union in French Guinea), and he became its first general-secretary in 1946. The SPTT was affiliated with the French *Confédération Générale des Travailleurs* (CGT/General Workers' Union), at that time associated with the French Communist Party (PCF). In March 1946, Sékou Touré attended the CGT Congress in Paris; in October of the same year, he became a founding member of the *Rassemblement Démocratique Africain* (RDA/African Democratic Union), an anticolonial movement created in Bamako that included representatives from all the French West African colonies. In 1948, Touré became secretary-general of the Coordinating Committee of the CGT in French West Africa and in 1952 secretary-general of the *Parti Démocratique*

de Guinée (PDG/Democratic Party of Guinea), the territorial branch of the RDA. In 1953, he organized a successful anticolonial general strike. In January 1956, he was elected deputy for Guinea in the French National Assembly in Paris, and in November of that year he became mayor of Conakry. Following the enactment of the French *Loi-Cadre* of 1956, which granted internal autonomy to each constituent territory of French West Africa, and as a result of the elections of March 1957, Sékou Touré was elected vice-president of Guinea. That same year, he was also elected vice-president of the RDA. The year 1958 was quite eventful in the political history of Guinea. In what is arguably one of the best-documented events in the history of French decolonization, an apparent misunderstanding between the visiting French president Charles de Gaulle and his Guinean host Sékou Touré (August 25–26) led to Guinea's lone "No" vote in the September 28 Referendum, resulting in Guinea's early independence (October 2) and the breakup of Franco-Guinean relations. It was on August 25 that Sékou Touré famously declared, "We prefer poverty as free men to riches as slaves," to which de Gaulle retorted, "If Guinea wants independence, let her take it, with all the consequences!" After which he pronounced these ominous parting words: "*Adieu, la Guinée!*"[26]

Sékou Touré was on friendly terms with Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah, whom he greatly admired and whose political philosophy he shared. It thus came as no surprise that when Nkrumah was overthrown by a military coup in February 1966, Touré readily gave him asylum and made him honorary co-president of Guinea. A convinced Pan-Africanist, Sékou Touré engineered the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union in May 1959 and was one of the "Founding Fathers" of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in May 1963. Over the years, his regime became increasingly authoritarian and repressive. By February 1978, it was estimated that about a thousand people were still in prison simply for opposing the regime; all were released in 1984. In addition, hundreds of prominent Guinean intellectuals and cadres were jailed, tortured, and executed, including former OAU Secretary-General Diallo Telli in 1976. By the early 1980s, Sékou Touré had moved away from African socialism, initiated a *rapprochement* with the world Islamic movement, and was attempting to attract foreign private investment, even visiting the United States and France in 1982. Sékou Touré eventually died of heart failure in an American hospital (Cleveland, Ohio) on March 26, 1984.[27]

Building the Popular-Revolutionary Republic in Guinea

There is no doubt that Sékou Touré's years as a member of the French communist-oriented CGT strongly influenced his political thought. He also spent some time at a trade union seminar in Prague (former Czechoslovakia). These are strong indications that Sékou Touré's Marxist-Leninist education was more thorough than that of Kwame Nkrumah. Sékou Touré himself admits readily that "it would be absurd to deny that I have read a great number of Mao Tse-tung's writings, as well as the writings of all the great Marxist philosophers."[28] Famous for his fiery and lengthy oratory, Sékou Touré has left us an abundant corpus of works, including all his speeches and other writings collected in 28 volumes in French (25 volumes in English) as well as some more theoretical works.[29]

A number of scholars—such as Lapido Adamolekun and Yves Bénot—have observed that during the first decade of Guinea's independence (1958–67), Sékou Touré not only refused to launch the country on a clear path to socialism but also deliberately downplayed the role of ideology in the construction of the new society. In his view, Guinea was initiating a revolution that was specifically African, outside of any ideological frame of reference and that adamantly refused to choose between capitalism and socialism: "Whenever we are asked to define ourselves and to choose, we reply that . . . we define ourselves in reference to Africa and we choose Africa. We are told that we must necessarily choose between capitalism and socialism, but I regret to say that . . . we are practically incapable to define what capitalism is, what socialism is."[30] In an interview with French journalist Fernand Gigon, Touré is even more explicit: "It is almost certain that we would have failed if we had stuck blindly to an abstract philosophy . . . We are not interested in philosophy. We have concrete needs"[31] He went on to assert that concern with "theories which are strange to us" had little to do with the crucial tasks facing the country: "If we confine ourselves to purely ideological speculations, we shall not achieve anything"[32] For Touré, the main function of ideology is to mobilize the masses for the political and economic development of Guinea.

It was only at the Eighth National Congress of the PDG (1967) that Sékou Touré formally launched Guinea on the path to socialism: "The fundamental option of the Democratic Party of Guinea is to construct a socialist society . . . We must be clear: we are committed to socialism. That is an irreversible fact."[33] Sékou Touré's concept of socialism clearly derives from the orthodox definition of scientific socialism: "Socialism . . . is expressed by the effective exercise of political, economic and cultural power by the working people."[34] However, Touré also articulates a socialist ideology adapted to African realities, stating his preference for the term *communaucratic* instead of *African Socialism*: "Africa is essentially 'communaucratic.' Collective life and social solidarity give her habits a humanistic foundation . . . an African cannot imagine organizing his life outside that of his social group—family, village, or clan. The voice of African people is not individualistic."[35]

Like Nkrumah, Touré is eclectic in his choice of ideology in general and on his conception of Marxism in particular, viewing the latter more as a means to be adapted to specific local conditions than as an end in itself. Hence the emphasis on the practical side rather than on the theoretical aspects of Marxism: "In Marxism, the principles of organization, of democracy, of control, etc. everything which is concrete and concerns the organic life of given movements, perfectly find the means of becoming adapted to the prevailing conditions of Africa . . . I say that philosophy does not concern us. We have concrete needs."[36] Touré firmly believes in the supremacy of politics over the economy, just as Nkrumah does: "We shall . . . have the economy of our

politics and not the politics of our economy."[37] In an official party document, he elaborates further on this point: "In Guinea's revolutionary context, economic and social action is the materialization of the *political line*, the concrete expression of *political options*, the implementation of the creative principle of the PDG's *political philosophy*."[38]

Touré was profoundly influenced by the Marxist-Leninist ideology in his definition of the roles of the state and the party in the creation of institutions designed to translate socialist ideas into practice. The following statement clearly illustrates the Leninist doctrine of the preeminence of the party over the state: "We intend that the reason of State, the State interest, should be determined in a manner consistent with the interests and aspirations of the People, whose power, initiatives and actions are mediated by the Democratic Party of Guinea (PDG) . . . The Party assumes the leading role in the life of the nation: the political, judicial, administrative, economic and technical powers are in the hands of the PDG."[39] For Touré, the Democratic Party of Guinea is the definer of the general interest, the custodian of the popular will, and the incarnation of the collective thought of the whole Guinean people: "The Party constitutes the thought of the people of Guinea at its highest level and in its most complete form. The thought of the Party indicates the orientation of our actions; the thought of the Party specifies the principles which ought to direct our behavior, our collective and individual attitude."[40]

Evidently, Touré's whole political philosophy—as that of Nkrumah—revolved around the central concept of *the people*: "Our Plan will succeed because it has the People as its main focus, because it will be conceived by the People and realized for the People."[41] As a mass party, the PDG is the party of "the entire people of Guinea": "Revolution can only be the act of the people . . . No, the PDG is not a communist party; it is not a class party, it is the party of all the people of Guinea . . . it is a popular party whose program of action is based exclusively on the national interest of the Republic of Guinea."[42] As a result, the PDG (like Nkrumah's CPP) operated according to the principle of "Democratic Centralism," which allowed for a fairly high degree of popular participation in the political decision-making process. At the local level, local revolutionary authorities (*Pouvoirs Révolutionnaires Locaux*/PRL) were responsible for the management of social and economic development projects down to the village level. The Guinean socialist development strategy was based on a mixed economy in which the emphasis was on the creation of a dominant public sector with a relatively sizeable—mostly foreign—private sector.

The political thought of Sékou Touré has been concisely summed up by Immanuel Wallerstein: "The political thought of Sékou Touré combines the communaucratic impulse of Rousseau, the Leninist theory of the party structure with the Hobbesian theory of sovereignty."[43] Claude Rivière offers a more comprehensive and accurate summary of Touré's political thought: "The final statement of this [PDG] ideology was above all the brainchild of the Guinean leader who had been trained in three schools of thought—those of Africa, the West, and Marxist socialism. The basic aim of Sékou Touré's socialism or non-capitalist approach . . . is to alter the relationship between human beings. This is to be done by decolonizing their viewpoints and attitudes, and by creating a new man freed from a system of capitalistic exploitation and participating with all his strength in the development of his nation. Here nationalism transcends socialism."[44] In the final analysis, the failure of socialism in Guinea may be attributed to the extremely personalized rule of Sékou Touré, the prototype of the charismatic leader in Africa, variously referred to as Guinea's "Great Elephant" (*Sily*), "Supreme Guide of the Revolution," or even "Messiah." Indeed, from the mid-1950s until his death in 1984, Touré was the sole pivot of Guinea's politics, and the Guinean state, nation, and single party were all identified with the person of Touré himself. According to David and Marina Ottaway, perhaps his greatest failure was to create a *personalized* (rather than an *institutionalized*) political party: "Touré has worked harder and longer than any other African leader to build a party that would become the dominant political institution of the land and wield more effective, day-to-day power than the state. The end result has been a party that serves primarily as a direct extension of Touré himself rather than as a self-perpetuating body serving to institutionalize the revolution."[45] Toward the end of his regime (late 1970s–early 1980s), Sékou Touré moved progressively away from African socialism, encouraged the development of the private sector in the economy, and began to emphasize the "socialist" and "revolutionary" content of Islam. In the final analysis, Sékou Touré's obsessive and single-minded concern for power and his determination to survive as supreme leader of Guinea's unique "Party-State" prevailed over any other ideological or political considerations and led to his eventual political demise shortly before his death in March 1984.[46]

MODIBO KÉÏTA

A Biographical Note

First president of Mali, politician, and Pan-Africanist, Modibo Kéïta was born in Bamako (in what was then the French Sudan) on June 4, 1915. After attending primary and secondary school in Sudan, he went on for teacher training at *École William Ponty* in Dakar. In 1945, he (along with Mamadou Konaté) founded the *Bloc Soudanais* (BS). In 1946, the BS merged with the *Rassemblement Démocratique Africain* (RDA/African Democratic Union), an interterritorial, radical nationalist party then affiliated with the French Communist Party. In 1948, he was elected to the Territorial Assembly of the French Sudan; from 1956 to 1958, he served as deputy in and vice-president of the French National Assembly and also held a number of ministerial posts in the French government. From 1957 to 1959, he was a counselor in the French West African Federation. On January 17, 1959, he became president of the Mali Federation (including Senegal and the French Sudan) until it split apart on August 20, 1960.

On September 20, 1960, Kéïta became head of state and president of the newly-created Republic of Mali, a name chosen in reference to the glorious Mali Empire of medieval Africa. Under his presidency, Mali embarked on a path to socialism, both politically and economically. However, by 1967, the Malian economy was in crisis, forcing the Keita regime to sign a monetary agreement with France on February 15, 1967. On August 22, 1967, Kéïta's launching of a "Cultural Revolution" signaled a radicalization of the regime; more power was entrusted to a *Comité National de Defense de la Revolution* (CNDR/National Committee for the Defense of Revolution), as well as to the armed segment of the party, the Popular Militia. The militia's abuses of power apparently alienated a large segment of the populace and was the justification for the military coup d'état of November 19, 1968, which overthrew the Kéïta regime and inaugurated a military rule that would last 23 years. Modibo Kéïta died while in detention on May 16, 1977, apparently as a result of a lethal injection administered on direct orders from top officials of the government of Moussa Traoré.

Modibo Kéïta was—physically, politically, and symbolically—a giant among African statesmen. About 6 feet 3 inches tall, of an imposing build, and usually dressed in a flowing white *boubou* (gown) and white hat, he towered head and shoulders above his colleagues at meetings. Former French president Charles de Gaulle was reported to have said of Modibo Kéïta: "He is the only African head of state with whom I can speak eye-to-eye." A convinced and dedicated Pan-Africanist, he was a prominent member of the radical Casablanca Group of States. He was also instrumental in the creation of the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union, conceived as the nucleus of a "Union of African States," and one of the cofounders of the Organization of African Unity (OAU, May 1963). He successfully acted as OAU mediator in the 1963 Algerian-Morocco border war.[47]

Socialism in Mali[48]

Following the breakup of the short-lived Federation of Mali and the independence of Mali as a separate state on August 20, 1960, the Extraordinary Congress of the country's single party, the *Union Soudanaise*-RDA (US-RDA; September 22, 1960) enthusiastically decided to set the country on a socialist path to development. From then on, all the energies of the leaders were directed toward the building up of "socialism in one country," economically as well as politically, with a prevalent concern for ideology. Note that the socialist era of independent Mali was fairly brief and lasted only for eight years, from September 1960 to November 1968.

From the outset, the top priority of the US-RDA's political leadership was to build, in the shortest time possible, a new society aimed at the political, economic, social, and cultural empowerment of Mali's popular masses. They firmly believed that a type of socialism adapted to the specific conditions of Mali would be the best ideology to achieve this goal. Seydou Badian Kouyaté—ideologue of the US-RDA, leader of the party's left-wing faction,

and one-time minister of development—identifies three main characteristic features of Malian socialism: (1) a socialism based on agricultural workers and peasants rather than on a nonexistent proletariat; (2) a vibrant private sector encouraged to contribute to national development; and (3) respect of the Malian spiritual and religious values.[49] This last point deserves further scrutiny. Socialism, the Malian leaders argued, cannot be adopted wholesale; it must, of necessity, be adapted to the specific sociocultural context of Mali. Kouyaté is quite explicit on this point: "For us in Mali, the problem is clear. While our ultimate objective is *scientific socialism*, we have always believed that *our context is quite specific* . . . Under no circumstances shall we imitate what prevails and what has been done elsewhere; we must deal with our own material and moral realities . . . we do not pretend to invent socialism in the twentieth century: we simply wish *to adapt it to the conditions of our country*."[50] Modibo Kéïta himself elaborates on this important point as follows: "Africa has its own values, its own history. Africa can solve its own problems within the African context, using African methods . . . *We* thus *look at scientific socialism critically* . . . we try to extract from it values capable of infusing Malian realities . . . *We in Mali have never accepted blindly ready-made ideas*, whatever their origin."[51] Thus Malian socialism is grounded not only in African values but also, more broadly, in universal human values: "Socialism cannot be reduced to purely economic or social concerns. Its goal is man itself in its material, moral, spiritual and cultural dimensions. We think that the African man . . . must be open to all kinds of experiments."[52]

In organizational terms, the socialist option meant that the US-RDA functioned according to the Leninist principle of "Democratic Centralism," which institutionalizes communication between the leadership and the rank-and-file of the party, with ultimate decision-making power resting with the highest executive organ of the party, the National Political Bureau (*Bureau Politique National*/BPN). Other important organizational principles were the "primacy of the political" and collective decision making. According to the first, the party, being the emanation of the popular will, takes precedence over the administration. The second emphasizes the fact that decision making should be, as much as possible, the outcome of collective deliberation rather than expressing the will of a few.

As is the case in other socialist-populist regimes, *the people* were considered to be the ultimate beneficiary and the main agent of socialist development in Mali. Hence, observes Kouyaté, "the Party is the expression of the political organization of the people . . . It is to be found wherever the people lives, struggles and reflects on the problems of daily life and of economic and social progress."[53] This explains the nature of the US-RDA, which is essentially a decentralized mass party, with local branches at all levels of the country and society acting as the prime institutions of local self-government.[54]

Socialist planning was considered necessary to achieve the primary goal of improving the living conditions of the majority of the people, which, in Mali, were the peasants. Taking into account Mali's socioeconomic conditions, the top priority of socialist planning was the development of agriculture through

the agency of an elaborate network of rural cooperatives, down to the village level.[55] The second priority related to cultural development and called for a complete overhaul of Mali's educational system consistent with Mali's rich cultural heritage and time-honored indigenous African values, both of which were to be the keystone of the new system of education.[56]

JULIUS KAMBARAGE NYERERE

A Biographical Note

Julius Kambarage Nyerere—*Baba Ya Taifa* ("Father of the Nation") and first president of Tanzania, a founder of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and chairman of the South Commission—was one of the wisest and most respected leaders in Africa, as well as one of the most influential African intellectuals of his generation. Born in 1922 in Butiama (in northwestern Tanganyika, then a British colony), son of Chief Nyerere Burite of the Wazanaki, Julius Nyerere obtained a teacher's certificate from Makerere College (Kampala, Uganda) and, from 1946 to 1949, taught at a Catholic school in Tabora (Tanganyika). He then went on for further studies abroad, graduating with an MA in history and economics from the University of Edinburgh in 1952, making him the first Tanganyikan to gain a university degree. Reading widely and influenced by Fabian socialism, he evolved most of his political philosophy while at Edinburgh.

In 1954, Nyerere founded the territory's first nationalist party, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), whose initial aim was the improvement of the living conditions of the African people. TANU was popular, and its membership reached 200,000 by 1957. Gradual reforms in the colony led to the organization in 1958 of the first elections to the legislative council, in which TANU candidates (including Nyerere) won all 15 seats. Relentless TANU activism led to further reforms, leading up to limited self-government following the 1960 elections in which TANU swept the polls. Nyerere, who had been appointed chief minister, now petitioned the United Nations and engaged in negotiations with Britain over independence, which was eventually granted on December 9, 1961, with Nyerere as prime minister. He set about instituting a socialist form of government structured around a one-party state. In early 1962, Nyerere resigned his post and toured the country extensively to build up TANU membership. By December 1962, Tanganyika became a republic, and Nyerere returned to office as president. Political and ethnic conflict in the island nation of Zanzibar (off the Tanganyikan coast) resulted in a bloody coup d'état there in 1963 and in an army mutiny in mainland Tanganyika in 1964. After calling on British troops and restoring order, Nyerere announced the merger of Tanganyika and Zanzibar into a new state, the United Republic of Tanzania, which officially came into being on April 27, 1964. In 1977, Nyerere merged TANU and Zanzibar's Afro-Shirazi Party into a single national party, *Chama Cha Mapinduzi* (CCM).

With national unity restored, Nyerere moved to promote African socialism. In February 1967, he proclaimed the "Arusha Declaration," which became the guide for Tanzania's policy of socialism and self-reliance, encapsulated in the concept of *Ujamaa* (meaning "community" or "familyhood" in Ki-Swahili). In 1970, a voluntary villagization program organizing peasant farmers into collective farms was launched. Following strong peasant resistance, forced villagization was initiated in 1975. By that time, 80 percent of the population was organized into 7,700 villages. This eventually resulted in a sharp drop in agricultural production and in an increased dependence of the country on foreign aid. In 1971, Nyerere nationalized key sectors of the economy. However, some successes were registered in the area of social development: infant mortality was reduced by 50 percent and adult literary increased to 90 percent.

Tanzania's foreign policy focused on two main issues: support for the liberation movements in Southern Africa and destabilization of the dictatorial regime of Idi Amin in Uganda. In 1970, Tanzania militarily invaded Uganda, removed Amin from power, and replaced him with former president Milton Obote. This military campaign, however, had a profoundly negative effect on the Tanzanian economy. In 1984, Nyerere voluntarily stepped down from Tanzania's presidency in favor of Ali Hassan Mwinyi, although he remained chair of the CCM until 1990. By that time, Nyerere had become one of Africa's most respected and revered elder statesmen, being affectionately referred to by his honorific title of *Mwalimu* ("The Teacher" in Ki-Swahili). He did acknowledge that some of his policies (notably *Ujamaa*) had failed and that a multiparty system should be considered. Nyerere also became actively engaged in various peace and conflict-resolution initiatives in Africa (particularly in Burundi). In 1987, he became one of the founders (and later chairman) of the South Commission, which seeks to bridge the gap between rich and poor countries. Julius Nyerere died of leukemia in a London hospital on October 14, 1999.[57]

UJAMAA in Tanzania[58]

It could rightly be argued that by systematically providing ideas and symbolic frameworks through which people could understand the society in which they lived and imagine the society of the future, Julius Nyerere was one of the most "ideological" of the African leaders, on a par with Kwame Nkrumah. Furthermore—and contrary to the assertions of Henry Bienen—Nyerere did not hesitated to create a blueprint for a new society and translate his ideas into programs for action.[59] Thus, in his preface to *Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism*, Nyerere laments the "lack of ideology" as well as "the absence of a generally accepted and easily understood statement of philosophy and policy" in Tanzania since early 1962. The adoption of the "Arusha Declaration" of February 3, 1967, was meant to address this concern and fill this gap.[60]

The concept of *Ujamaa*—a specific type of African socialism, different and distinct from both capitalism and socialism—is at the core of the political

thought of Julius Nyerere: "'Ujamaa' . . . or 'Familyhood,' describes our socialism. It is *opposed to capitalism*, which seeks to build a happy society on the basis of the exploitation of man by man; and it is equally *opposed to* doctrinaire *socialism which* seeks to build a happy society on a philosophy of inevitable conflict between man and man."[61] On this crucial point of doctrine, the views of Nyerere differ significantly from those of Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah and Mali's Modibo Kéïta, both of whom proclaimed the adherence of their respective states and parties to an orthodox brand of Marxism-Leninism labeled *scientific socialism* (what Nyerere calls *doctrinaire socialism*).

Where Julius Nyerere also disagrees with both Nkrumah and Kéïta is when he argues that African indigenous societies were essentially socialist in nature. As he put it himself, "Traditional African society was in practice organized on a basis which was in accordance with socialist principles."[62] For one thing, "in traditional African society *everybody* was a worker." Furthermore, "one of the most socialistic achievements of our society was the sense of security it gave to its members, and the universal hospitality on which they could rely," and "every member of society . . . contributed his fair share of effort toward the production of its wealth."[63] In addition, Nyerere rejects the capitalist notion of individual land ownership, which, he argues, is diametrically opposed to African indigenous traditions according to which land customarily belongs to the community, whose leader may allow people to use it on a "need to" basis: "To us in Africa, land was always recognized as belonging to the community . . . the African's right to land was simply the right to use it; he had no other right to it." Observing that "the foundation, and the objective, of African Socialism is the extended family" and that "Modern African Socialism can draw from its traditional heritage of the recognition of 'society' as an extension of the basic family unit," he concludes, "We must . . . regain our former attitude of mind—our traditional African socialism—and apply it to the new societies we are building today."[64]

For Julius Nyerere, socialism was, above all, "*an attitude of mind*" characterized by a non-doctrinaire political perspective: "Socialism—like democracy—is an *attitude of mind*. In a socialist society it is the socialist attitude of mind, and not the rigid adherence to a standard political pattern, which is needed to ensure that the people care for each other's welfare . . . In the individual as in the society, it is an *attitude of mind which* distinguishes the socialist from the non-socialist."[65] In the final analysis, for Nyerere true socialism is a universal, humanistic concept that relates not only to the Tanzanian man or the African man but to humanity as a whole: "Socialism is international; its ideas and beliefs relate to man in society, not just to Tanzanian man in Tanzania, or African man in Africa."[66] In "Ujamaa: The Basis of Socialism," he elaborates further on this point as follows: "Our recognition of the family to which we all belong must be extended yet further—beyond the tribe, the community, the nation, or even the continent—to embrace the whole society of mankind."[67] Ultimately, *man*—and, by extension, the concept of *human equality*—is at the center of political, economic, and social development in a socialist society: "First, and most central of all, is that under socialism *Man* is the purpose of all social activity. The service of man, the furtherance of his human development, is in fact the purpose of society itself . . . the purpose of all social, economic and political activity must be *man* . . . The basis of socialism is a belief in the oneness of man and the common historical destiny of mankind. Its basis, in other words, is *human equality* . . . The justification of socialism is *man*."[68]

As noted earlier, the "Arusha Declaration" of February 1967 translated, for the first time, the ideology of *Ujamaa* into a concrete program of action and, as such, constituted a blueprint for the new society to be built in Tanzania. In essence, the "Arusha Declaration" outlines a strategy of development based on self-reliance and aimed at satisfying the basic needs of the majority of the Tanzanian people: "To a socialist, the first priority of production must be the manufacture and distribution of such goods as will allow every member of the society to have sufficient food, clothing and shelter, to sustain a decent life."[69] Put differently, the principal aim of the party is "to see that the Government mobilizes all the resources of this country towards the elimination of poverty, ignorance and disease." To achieve this goal, "the state must have effective control over the principal means of production," and "it is the responsibility of the state to intervene actively in the economic life of the nation."[70] Furthermore, because Tanzania has a predominantly rural economy, *agriculture*—through the increased production of food and cash crops—constitutes the top priority in this strategy of development, while industrialization is based on "import substitution." This strategy of development also demands *hard work* on the part of the Tanzanian people, who must understand and implement the policy of *self-reliance*, which implies that "they must become self-sufficient in food, serviceable clothes and good housing" and that they "avoid depending upon other countries for assistance."[71] The implementation of this strategy of development required the creation of new economic, social, and political institutions, such as cooperative societies and *ujamaa* villages. It also entailed a radical restructuring of the system of education, with particular focus on adult education and literacy, universal primary and secondary education, and the promotion of African values and languages, notably the introduction of Ki-Swahili as the main medium of education at all levels.[72]

As some observers have noted—and has Nyerere himself later acknowledged—TANU's attempt at implementing a participatory form of socialist development in Tanzania was a dismal failure and resulted in the progressive deterioration of the rural economy as well as in the extended impoverishment of the peasant masses. P. L. E. Idahosa provides a concise and fairly accurate summary of the failure of Nyerere's economic policies: "Nyerere's policies . . . resulted in many features that are the opposite of what *ujamaa* was intended to achieve: forced villagization, the absence of participation coupled with alienation from the state, bureaucratization, increased class differentiations, low agricultural production and industry acquisition of most of the state's development resources."[73] Nyerere's life has been one of dedicated commitment, austerity, hard work, humility, and integrity. But

even such a commitment to the ideals of justice, equity, and socioeconomic development; a leadership free from the taint of scandal or any hunger for power; and a readiness to admit and retreat from error was, alas, not enough to ensure that Tanzania would continue along the road mapped out at the beginning of his career.

CONCLUSION

This chapter continued the survey of the political, economic, social, and cultural dimensions of the socialist-populist ideology from a distinctly socialist perspective initiated in Chapter 5. This chapter focused specifically on the statesmen who, in spite of their socialist rhetoric, used the socialist-populist ideology—in various degrees—primarily as an instrument of control and coercion (sometimes even as an instrument of terror, as in the case of Sékou Touré): Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Ahmed Sékou Touré of Guinea, Modibo Kéïta of Mali, and Julius K. Nyerere of Tanzania. It is important to note in this regard that there is a significant difference of degree between these leaders in terms of the authoritarian vs. democratic nature of their regimes. Thus the most autocratic and authoritarian (even totalitarian) tendencies were exhibited by Sékou Touré and Kwame Nkrumah (more pronounced in the former than in the latter), while Modibo Kéïta and Julius K. Nyerere were somewhat more liberal, open, and democratic in their exercise of power (Nyerere more so than Kéïta). In addition to the nature of their political systems, the other common characteristics of these regimes are priority given to ideology and political organization over economic emancipation, a top-down system of administration, and state control over the economy.

There is a significant degree of convergence in the way in which Kwame Nkrumah, Sékou Touré, and Modibo Kéïta conceived of African socialism. One should remember that these three leaders were extremely close while in power. In May 1959, they jointly created a "Union of African States" as the nucleus of a "United States of Africa." Furthermore, after his overthrow by a military coup in February 1966, Kwame Nkrumah was given political asylum by Sékou Touré, who granted him the honorary title of "co-president" of Guinea. These three leaders' conception of African socialism had the following common characteristics:

- Ideology and practice are inextricably linked.
- *Politics* has supremacy over the economy.
- *Socialism* is not a sacred dogma but a *guide to action*.
- *African socialism* is a socialism building on and adapted to African indigenous values, culture, traditions, and society.
- *The people* are the main agents and ultimate beneficiaries of socialist development.
- African socialism aims at creating "*a new man*."
- The single party operates according to the Marxist-Leninist principle of *Democratic Centralism*, which institutionalizes communication between the leadership and the rank-and-file of the party, with ultimate decision-making power resting with the highest executive organ of the party.
- *Collective decision making* is based on collective deliberation and *consensus*.
- The state has control over the economy.
- *Pan-African* foreign policy is aimed at creating a *Union of African States* as a first step toward the eventual establishment of a *United States of Africa*.

In addition to this common view of African socialism, Kwame Nkrumah proposed an original philosophy and ideology for an independent Africa based on indigenous humanist African principles, which he called "*Philosophical Consciencism*." This philosophy integrates the three main segments of African society (traditional, Western, and Islamic) and was later popularized in African studies through Ali Mazrui's concept of the "*Triple Heritage*."

Julius Nyerere's concept of African Socialism (*Ujamaa*, or "Familyhood") differs somewhat from that of Nkrumah, Touré, and Kéïta in a number of respects; the essential characteristics of *Ujamaa* could be summarized as follows:

- Socialism is a *universal*, humanistic concept. *Man* is at the center of political, economic, and social development in a socialist society.
- Socialism is an "attitude of mind" characterized by a non-doctrinaire political perspective.
- *Ujamaa* differs from both *capitalism* and socialism, and it rejects "*doctrinaire socialism*."
- *African indigenous societies*, based on the "extended family," were essentially socialist in nature.
- *Ujamaa* is a *self-reliant* strategy of development based on *agriculture* and implemented through cooperative societies and *ujamaa* (communal) *villages*.

What Nkrumah, Touré, Kéïta, and Nyerere did have in common was a deep and abiding faith in the power of African socialism to radically and durably transform their societies in a way that would satisfy the basic economic and social needs of their peoples, thereby significantly improving their quality of life.

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